



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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27 November 1992

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Angola

Government and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola delegations met in Namibe on 26 November, Luanda Radio reported. At the end of the one-day meeting the two sides issued a three-point joint communique which stated the sides' "full acceptance of the validity of the Angola peace accords;" their intent to "effectively" implement the ceasefire with an "immediate cessation" of all offensive operations; and, to request an "extension of the UN Angola Verification Mission-2 mandate".

An Armed Forces of Angola General Staff communique, reported by Luanda Radio, stated that Hercules C-130 aircraft "flying from Zaire" overflew the city of Uige on 24-25 November, then flew southeast. The communique also said that a "South African" aircraft landed at Nzeto on 25 November and unloaded "unspecified cargo".

South Africa

On 26 November, State President F.W. de Klerk issued a timetable for the installation of an "interim government of national unity," SAPA reported. Mr. de Klerk said that "a fully representative government of national unity should be in place no later than the first half of 1994". Noting that such a government "cannot be determined in isolation from the process which must necessarily precede it," the state president went on to outline a timetable of the necessary steps. Under the De Klerk plan, elections would be held "not later than March/April 1994". The African National Congress termed the timetable "unacceptable," calling for elections in 1993.

Further on G-15 Third Summit in Dakar

G-15 News Conference; Diouf Comments on Meet

*AB2411175392 Dakar Radio Senegal in French
2200 GMT 23 Nov 92*

[Excerpts] [Passage indistinct] The Dakar G-15 summit (?is over). A news conference ended this third summit of the group's heads of state and government [words indistinct] and South-South cooperation. Seven heads of state and government attended the news conference chaired by Abdou Diouf. Once more, there was talk of cooperation—first among member countries of the South, and then with those of the North. Mr. Diouf disclosed that the Yugoslav prime minister had sent a word of excuse for his absence, just as the presidents of Venezuela and Peru did. Mela Kadi has further details on this news conference.

[Kadi] At this news conference, most of the discussion centered on South-South dialogue, as well as on North-South dialogue. How, in concrete terms, will member countries of the South trade with developed countries? What is the latest country to be admitted into the group? Chile, a Latin American country. All other applications for admission are still being considered and the New Delhi meeting next year will enable us to know if they will be part of the G-15. The question of granting observer status to some countries is also being examined. [passage omitted]

Concerning countries of the South facing difficulties, Abdou Diouf declared that earlier on, in his capacity as chairman of the OAU and the Islamic Conference Organization, he advocated—with the assistance of the Nonaligned Movement—the convening of an international conference on Somalia and the UN's intervention in Liberia. It is perhaps in this regard that one must place President Diouf's call for the involvement of African countries in all the activities of other G-15 countries. Our countries are also involved in [words indistinct] solidarity among the various members. [passage indistinct]

North-South dialogue: This was the other important aspect of the objectives of G-15. It needs to be revamped and strengthened. The South should first get the North to take interest in its activities. It is true, Mr. Abdou Diouf said, that so far the South has not been sufficiently involved, for instance, in the GATT negotiations. That will change, he said. We will correct that. The South will also try at all international conferences to harmonize the positions of all its members:

[Begin Diouf recording] The main objective of the G-15 is to strengthen South-South cooperation. But, one of the key objectives is also to revamp the North-South dialogue, and we seize every opportunity to help put that dialogue back on track. You heard me talking a short while ago about the telegram we sent to U.S. President-Elect Clinton, stressing the hope we nourish in his policies, in order that the significant changes taking place in the world today may help to resolve our planet's

development problems, particularly the problems facing the development of the South. And, you know, when the G-15 prepared its document, we stated our position on the new world order. As G-15 coordinator, I forwarded this document to all G-7 members, particularly to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the current chairman. I know that the G-7 leaders took account of some issues raised in that document at their Munich meeting, and I received a very encouraging response from Chancellor Kohl. Thus, we try through diverse steps to maintain contact with member countries of the North and to push for the resumption of a North-South dialogue, which will not be a confrontation but a peaceful and responsible discussion. [end recording]

Turning once more to cooperation among the G-15 members, Abdou Diouf—who passed the group's chairman-coordinator baton to India—confirmed that our countries will strengthen cooperation in all spheres. To emphasize the point that all this will have to be done with our peoples, (?failing which there will be no progress), he raised the question of an interaction of peoples based on solidarity in all fields: culture, education, economy, technology, and communications. [passage omitted]

It should be added that in answer to a question, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe said he was very impressed by the size of information that would henceforth be disseminated by the South Center for Data Exchange on Investment, Trade, and Technology. The prime minister of Jamaica—whose country was attending a G-15 summit for the first time—expressed his satisfaction at having taken part in the Dakar meeting, conscious that Jamaica would take advantage of the experience already acquired by the G-15.

Indian Prime Minister Addresses G-15 Summit

*BK2511101792 Delhi ISI Diplomatic Information
Service in English 1430 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[“Speech in closed session at G-15 summit, Dakar (Senegal) by P.V. Narasimha Rao, prime minister of India: 21st Nov. 92”]

[Text] President Abdou Diouf, distinguished colleagues. I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for hosting this summit, which reflects Senegal's energetic and constructive espousal of ideals of the G-15. It is a pleasure to be in this beautiful capital Dakar and to participate in deliberations that will, I trust, mark another milestone in our group's progress.

Since 1989, when we first set up our group, we have covered considerable ground. And yet, looking back, what kind of assessment can we make of the group's accomplishments? We need to be dispassionate and objective about self-examination. In 1989, we live in a different world, a world of power blocs confronting each other, of mistrust and hostility plaguing relations among nations and, indeed, often within nations themselves. In the last three years, social and economic systems, frozen

for decades by ideological and other compulsions, have thawed. The spectre of nuclear war is less ominous while concern for democracy and the rights of man have become pervasive.

However, these hopeful and positive developments have not rid our world of some of its fundamental problems. If the danger of a nuclear holocaust has receded, localized conflicts loom large before us. Somalia today is a heart-rending spectacle. The world community did, perhaps, respond rather slowly to its enormous humanitarian crisis and this was further compounded, by the continuing tensions between the two main contending factions which impeded relief supplies. We cannot afford such tragedy. The continuing anguish in the erstwhile Yugoslavia comes also compellingly to mind.

Worldwide poverty remains a scourge. Trade is hamstrung by barriers and preconditions. Terrorism, especially of the sort instigated and supported from across international boundaries, attempts to destabilize established governments. Our planet's fragile and finely tuned environment is being destroyed by greed and despoilation while much good has come to us in three years since our group commenced, much more remains to be done.

Our last summit in Caracas helped to concretize our group's ideals by identifying projects for South-South cooperation. By adopting and projecting a pragmatic and practical world view, we have signalled to the rest of the world that we are a group of dependable partners in growth. Our message is clear. In an interdependent world, groups of countries cannot expect to flourish in isolation or at the expense of others. An oasis of prosperity cannot survive in a desert of deprivation. As developing countries we have the special responsibility of fostering cooperation amongst ourselves to put our own talents and resources to best use. In both respects, our group has registered excellent progress. This is not self-adulation. Success, whatever its measure, should be a stimulus to even more vigorous effort which alone will yield the fruits we seek, in the measure we wish. This effort demands dedication and consistency. At this summit, our attendance has been good. It could have been better. Our group was created in the expectation that it would attract sustained and high-level commitment from its members. The fact that all of us here today have made it a point to be here, despite other compulsions and constraints, is true vindication of our faith.

The need for perseverance and cooperation is self-evident. India has had the privilege of developing projects on solar energy applications and gene banks. We have come together to pool our experience and talent in areas of importance to us as developing countries. Solar energy has to be seen as an alternative to more expensive and less accessible forms of energy. Gene banks build up information and expertise in an area where scientific progress can, in the not too distant a future, successfully tackle some of the basic needs of developing countries.

Excellencies,

What kind of orientation and thrust should we give to our activities in the coming months? Let me try and elaborate my views in this regard.

There are some basic premises on which we have to operate. Firstly, we are developing countries, placed in a world that is unfavourable to us in many respects. Our trade is hampered. Our technological advance is inhibited. Our commodities are under-priced. Our monetary systems are held hostage to outside influences.

Secondly, we are confronted by the paradox of an increasing globalization of the world economy, together with the wide chasm that persists between the North and the South.

Thirdly, we, developing countries must make development in all its aspects, particularly scientific and technological, our primary objective. Or else, we are destined to fall further and further behind in the accelerated pursuit of progress by humankind.

Fourthly, there is no alternative to cooperation. South-South cooperation pools the limited resources of developing countries to collective wealth. North-South cooperation attempts to utilize the resources of the one in service of the other in such a way that the development of each brings benefits to the other.

Many countries in our group have embarked upon far-reaching social and economic changes. Such changes are designed to strengthen individual initiative by freeing the economy from unnecessary controls. They are intended to attract investment and provide (incentives) for growth. Our choice of popular governance provides fertile ground for innovation and enthusiasm. This is our own prescription, suited and tailored to our own conditions, and one which we have devised for, and applied to, ourselves. The framework of interdependence among nations, with equal partnership, has to be restored to the international economic order. The industrialised North cannot by itself find solutions or offer remedies for the fundamental shortcomings that afflict us all. Its dialogue with the South must seek solutions which ensure the redressal of deep-seated structural problems that affect us all. A sustainable international development profile depends upon the closure of the gap between the poor and the rich.

The multilateral framework of cooperation will gain strength only if it finds solutions fair to all. External debt has to be treated as a global issue mirroring structural deficiencies in the international economic system. Increasing protectionist trends should yield place to a global economy based on long-term patterns of growth, whose benefits are available to all. We have yet to commence our earnest effort to bring about these desirable results through appropriate adjustment of the global economy and international monetary system. Environmental protection activities must be formulated through a determination of costs based on the needs, priorities and capacities of countries in such a manner that the development process of developing countries does not suffer a setback and lead to wider and wider

disparities between the developing and the developed. These factors constitute a dynamic programme of global scenario of development for an agenda for the North-South dialogue.

Mr. President,

Greater content to South-South cooperation requires firm decisions. Those projects already identified, which are at different levels of implementation must be fulfilled. They symbolise our determination to develop multipliers as examples of excellence in areas of vital concern to countries in the South. India will contribute U.S. Dollar 25,000 to the SITDEX [South Investment, Trade and Technology Data Exchange] project so ably coordinated by Malaysia which provides an essential input in the area of trade, technology and development. Our desire to set up a vocational training centre for the use of G-15 countries in Africa is reflected in a proposal which India has circulated at this summit. We are also ready to extend to our fellow G-15 countries training in the area of computer operation. A proposal in this regard has also been circulated. The G-15 should not function as a closed club, it should be a catalyst to extend cooperation among all developing countries. Therefore, what India or any one among us offers should be available to all developing countries.

Our cooperation and growth will be in direct proportion to the degree of commitment we are willing to bring to the conceptual and thrust areas of the Group of 15. In addition, also to shoulder responsibilities in the areas of structural importance for the global economy [sentence incomplete as received]. To this end, our representatives should be authorised to oversee the implementation of agreed projects to facilitate an interim report before our next summit. We must ensure an accepted rate of progress. Our representatives should also meet in the coming months to evolve an approach to areas of common concern with a view to taking up North-South questions. This can bring about long term stabilisation of the global economy and lend greater weight and credence to our efforts with the G-7. Long term solutions must be based on transparency, equity and cooperative action.

Mr. President,

I have tried to outline an objective for our group, its inner strengths reinforced through greater cooperation, playing an increasingly effective and useful role in the global context. I look forward to cooperating with all our colleagues gathered here in an endeavour designed to promote goodwill and growth, peace and prosperity. Thank you.

Reportage on ECOWAS, Developments in Liberia

OAU, UN Asked To Help Implement Cease-Fire

AB0911122992 *Lagos Voice of Nigeria in English*
1030 GMT 9 Nov 92

[Text] A summit of nine ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] leaders has invited the secretaries general of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to appoint representatives to work with the subregional body in the implementation of the Liberian peace plan. The heads of state, who met in Abuja, reaffirmed the right of ECOMOG [ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] as a peacekeeping force to defend itself against armed attacks by any quarter.

They condemned without reservation the unprovoked and premeditated aggression of Charles Taylor against ECOMOG. They gave midnight of Tuesday [10 November] as the new deadline for all the warring factions in Liberia to stop hostilities. The summit directed ECOMOG to ensure not only respect for the cease-fire but the encampment and disarming of all combatants.

Pullout of Senegalese Troops, U.S. Viewed

AB2111210592 *Libreville Africa No. 1 in French*
1830 GMT 21 Nov 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The UN Security Council on Thursday [19 November] placed an arms embargo against Liberia at the request of the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] member countries in an effort to end the civil war that has been ravaging Liberia since December 1989. This war continues to claim victims. This morning, a Liberian Armed Forces soldier was executed at a Monrovia public square after having been accused of murdering a civilian.

At the same time, we have learned of the imminent withdrawal of Senegalese soldiers from the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group. From Dakar, Malene Ndiaye gives more information:

[Begin recording] According to reliable sources, this withdrawal is motivated by the fact that Senegalese soldiers on the field are too exposed and that the means put at their disposal by the United States are insufficient—among other reasons. Added to this, according to a Senegalese weekly, the categorical refusal by the United States to a proposal to physically eliminate Charles Taylor, the National Patriotic Front leader. This proposal was allegedly made by the Senegalese general, but this yet to be verified. In reality, this idea was brought up in June by Guinean President Lansana Conte during the ECOWAS summit in Dakar. The Sierra Leonean president expressed the same opinion but more explicitly.

Meanwhile, there is increasing speculation here in Dakar on the eventual withdrawal of the Senegalese contingent, but, however probable, this measure is conditioned to the solution of an important financial problem. The

United States, which estimates the air repatriation of the Senegalese contingent at 390 million CFA, will only put one-third of this sum at Senegal's disposal.

The Senegalese weekly, SUDHEBDO, quoting a source close to the American Embassy in Dakar, said that General Seick planned to withdraw his men by sea either from Monrovia or Sierra Leone on the condition, the newspaper explained, that Washington put a ship at their disposal to make the voyage to Dakar.

If we are to believe this newspaper, which is generally well informed, it is practically decided that the soldiers who will be withdrawn from Liberia will be rapidly redeployed to the Casamance. With the approach of the 1993 elections, the state's highest authorities have reportedly chosen a military solution to check the violence in this region of Senegal. [end recording]

OAU 'Faces Severe Financial Problems'

AB1811060792 *Paris AFP in English* 1504 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] Addis Ababa, Nov 17 (AFP)—The Organisation of African Unity faces severe financial problems because member states have not paid their contributions, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim warned here.

Opening a commission session due to consider the 1993-94 budget, Salim said Monday that the OAU was "in distress" just at a time when it was expanding its peacekeeping role and efforts at economic integration.

He called on member states in arrears to come forward with the funds.

In the current year, with budget expenditure estimated at 20 million dollars, the organisation had received only 400,000 dollars six months into the exercise, Salim said.

Some diplomats attending the opening session charged that the OAU was trying to live beyond its means.

BEAC on Creating Monetary Market

AB2411105992 *Paris AFP in French* 2020 GMT 22 Nov 92

[Excerpt] Brazzaville, 22 Nov (AFP)—Jean-Felix Mamalepot, governor of the Bank of Central African States [BEAC], announced yesterday in Brazzaville that a sub-regional monetary market will begin on 1 January 1994. At a news conference held as part of activities to mark the BCEA's 20th anniversary celebrations, Mr. Mamalepot stated that the process of establishing this market—which is geared toward the economic and monetary integration of the Bank's member states—was on track.

Mr. Mamalepot said as a prelude to this market, the BEAC had implemented with the assistance of member countries measures aimed at restructuring local commercial banks facing difficulties, with the exception of those in Gabon where "the banking system performed well," he pointed out. These banks owe the BEAC 243 billion

CFA francs, Mr. Mamalepot disclosed, stressing that the central bank had decided to consolidate these debts to the tune of 234 billion CFA francs over a 15-year period.

The BEAC governor accused the management of the local banks of creating their own difficulties. "The banks are poorly managed; accounting and administrative structures are disorganized; there is a lack of skilled workers, and reckless risks taken when granting loans," Mr. Mamalepot said. He went on to assert that the executives were "in league with external influences against their own banks."

Asked for his view on the devaluation of the CFA franc, Mr. Mamalepot said it was a "figment of the imagination that can disorganize and destabilize member states." "If there is a decision to devalue now, our societies will be destabilized, and those who support the idea do so for their hegemonic interests," he continued, stressing that such a devaluation would go "against the franc zone and the stability of the CFA franc." [passage omitted]

SADC Food Security Unit on Regional Drought

*MB2411170892 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1618 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[Text] Harare Nov 24 SAPA—The drought is late in breaking in the eastern half of Southern Africa, striking at the chances of recovery of some of the worst-hit nations in the region, agriculturalists said in Harare on Tuesday [24 November]. The food security unit of the Southern African Development Community [SADC], a 10-nation economic grouping that excludes South Africa, said in its latest bulletin there has been a good start to the rainy season in Angola, western Zambia, Botswana, and south and west Zimbabwe.

But, the bulletin said, the inter-tropical convergence zone or dense band of moist air that brings most of the area its summer rain, has been less active over the eastern half of the sub-continent than it has been for four years. The unit said Malawi was still experiencing

severe dry conditions, and warned of serious famine conditions developing unless the delivery of food imports was speeded up.

Authorities had aimed at importing 37,500 [metric] tons of cereals in October, but were 5,000 tons behind schedule. Only 21 per cent of aid scheduled to arrive by the end of last month had actually turned up, the bulletin said.

The unit said production hopes in southern Mozambique were being compromised by late rain—as much as two months behind in some parts of the country—while there was also a critical shortage of seeds that was posing "the greatest threat to post-drought recovery". Drought relief stocks of maize were precariously low in all provinces, worth less than a month's supply, a situation worsened by congestion at the ports of Maputo and Beira.

In Zimbabwe, good rains had fallen in the south and west of the country, but had been patchy in the north and north-east, the country's main crop-growing areas. There was a shortage of irrigation water, which considerably reduced the chances of good early irrigated crops. The unit also noted commercial sales of seed and distribution of government-granted seed packs indicated that 755,000 hectares would be planted to maize by commercial and peasant farmers this year: 30 percent of the 1990/91 hectareage.

The government drought recovery programme promised 1.6 million hectares of peasant land would be ploughed by government-supplied tractors. To date, 13,000 hectares had been ploughed, the bulletin said.

In Swaziland, early rains had been well below normal and less than 25 per cent of farmers had ploughed, while in Namibia rain was unevenly distributed and below average hectareage was expected because of the poor condition of draught animals and shortages of seed. Rain in Tanzania had been late and below normal to date, while input shortages were dogging drought recovery. So far only 61 per cent of the 182,000 tons of fertiliser required and 55 per cent of the 12,600 tons of seed needed had arrived, said the unit.

Kenya

FORD 'Unveils' Party Manifesto

EA2611174992 Nairobi KNA in English 1346 GMT 26 Nov 92

[Text] Nairobi, 26 Nov (KNA)—The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)-Kenya today unveiled its 82-page manifesto in which it has vowed to enact laws that will allow for the impeachment of the president if "he acts in flagrant disregard or contravention of the constitution".

The manifesto, which is a blueprint for the opposition party's onslaught for the 29 December general elections, tackles several areas of the country's socio-politico-economic aspects.

The manifesto, which was unveiled to the press at a pre-launching ceremony at the Chester House proposes the introduction of the post of a prime minister, who will be appointed by the president to be head of the government. "Executive powers of the state will be exercised collectively by the council of ministers under the chairmanship of the prime minister and will keep the president informed of the policies of the government, consulting regularly with the president to ensure the principles of collective responsibility in the executive branch."

On the civil service, the manifesto says that necessary measures will be taken to effect a "meaningful" delinking of all political parties from the government and to ensure the neutrality [and] objectivity of the civil service.

"The judiciary will be separated from the executive and strengthened through the allocation of sufficient funds and sufficient qualified personnel," the manifesto says.

A new office of the inspector-general, enjoying security of tenure, will be created in the FORD-Kenya government and shall monitor the performance of the civil service and handle public complaints to ensure that public officials do not apply rules "mechanically, maliciously or sadistically - thereby adversely affecting the lives and fundamental rights of the people".

[The] FORD-Kenya manifesto said that the party will ensure the independence of the labor movement and other working people's associations from the state, noting that FORD-Kenya will dismantle COTU [Central Organisation of Trade Unions] as a state-dominated umbrella organisation for the workers and encourage the coming together of workers into an organisation of their own.

Much of the manifesto is devoted to the economic and development policy for the country. The manifesto decries the rising trade deficit which it estimates at 33.5 billion. It also decries the increase in government which is rising annually at 25 percent per annum, thereby fuelling the inflationary spiral.

FORD Accuses Government of Robbing Institutions

EA2511181292 Nairobi KNA in English 1352 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] Nairobi, 25 Nov (KNA)—Three senior officials of FORD [Forum for the Restoration of Democracy]-Kenya today accused the KANU (Kenya African National Union) government of robbing the public institutions. Addressing a press conference at Chester House today, the three, Messrs Paul Muite, first vice president; Professor Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, secretary for public policy and economic affairs; and Mr Robert Shaw, his assistant, today accused the government of continuing to rob the public institutions. The three also questioned what they termed the irregular and illegal advancing or lending of huge sums of money by the central bank to certain politicians and parastatal banks at the outstanding increase from kshs [Kenyan shillings] 80,000,000 in June last year to kshs 8,000 million a year later.

The FORD-Kenya members expressed concern over the source of large amounts of money being dished out by the members of the party. "We mentioned at the beginning that the looting from our state institutions is continuing as if there was no tomorrow. We wish to cite two major recent examples of this today for [the] public record and further investigation," they added. The trio accused the KANU [Kenya African National Union] government of looting the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation and the Kenya Meat Commission. Mr Muite blamed the high rate of corruption on the single party dictatorship, saying that FORD-Kenya would try to eradicate corruption irrespective of the individuals involved.

Somalia

Mahdi's Interior Minister on Shelling of Aid Ship

AB2511173392 London BBC World Service in English 1515 GMT 25 Nov 92

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] You might think that with much of Somalia crying out for emergency food aid it would be a rather strange action to stop a food ship docking in Mogadishu. But that is what Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed's forces did yesterday when they fired shells at a ship carrying food. It seems they want more United Nations troops to help with the distribution of the food already in the dock. Ali Mahdi's interior minister, Mohamed (Kon-yare) Afrah, is currently in Nairobi. On the line, Josephine Hazeley asked him why they had gone so far as to fire on a food ship:

[Begin recording] [Mohamed] What we are saying is that there is too much food in the port, which is [caused by] the lack of distribution to the needy people. We ask to implement the agreement of Ali Mahdi [sentence as heard]. We are asking every militia to get out of the

airport and port. We are asking, according to the agreement, to deploy U.S. [as heard] forces into those places. They are not implementing. You have to understand me. So, there is no reason food to bring and pile it up in the port and the people are suffering 100 meters' distance from the boat [sentence as heard]. So no implementation. Food is coming here but nobody is benefiting now.

[Hazeley] So, how much food do you know is in the port?

[Mohamed] Maybe it is 50,000 or 40,000 metric tons of mixed food or any and every stock of food in the port of Mogadishu. And waiting deliver people are dying near it, and nobody is speaking because of lack of implementation by the UN—that agreement signed [sentence as heard].

[Hazeley] You mean the agreement to deploy UN troops for the distribution of food?

[Mohamed] Yes, because they were supposed to take over the port and airport. And now, if we ask, they say Aidid refused. Who is Aidid? Why he refuse? Because people are suffering.

[Hazeley] But Aidid is a powerful warlord in your country. So they must take notice of him.

[Mohamed] This is what you think. That is why many people are mistaken as they think, why do they not protect and bring the ships to the port? Now we refuse and it is closed for 21 days now. Aidid is there and if he is very powerful, why don't they bring the ships? Can I ask you that question?

[Hazeley] So, I mean will you continue to shell whatever vessel comes to the port?

[Mohamed] We have given a warning that they not cannot bring the ships to Mogadishu port until they solve the disputes and problems which created by the other militia leader [sentence as heard]. [end recording]

Tanzania

Rwandan Peace Talks Open in Arusha

EA2511215492 Dar es Salaam Radio Tanzania
External Service in English 1600 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] Arusha: Talks aimed at ending a two-year civil war in Rwanda opened in Arusha today after two days of wrangling over the agenda. Reports from Arusha say the representatives of the Rwandese Government and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] were expected to start negotiations this afternoon. According to the reports, the government side, led by the Rwandese foreign minister, Mr. Boniface Ngulinzira, and rebels of the RPF would start by tackling the formation of an all-party legislative assembly. The next item on the agenda is sharing ministerial posts in a transitional government. The government had initially wanted to start with the thorny issues of integrating the rebels into the national army, but the RPF refused, saying political matters had to be settled first.

Negotiations Continue

EA2711103092 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale
de la Republique Rwandaise in French 1800 CMT 26
Nov 92

[Text] Arusha negotiations: The negotiations have not yet reached the stage of examining the heart of the matter as delegates are still trying to agree on the agenda. It was only this evening, after the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] had asked for a moment for consultations, that the two delegations met for a new round of talks on what should be put on the agenda. Balthazar Nduwayezu reports:

[Begin recording] The two sides met behind closed doors this evening to decide whether or not to start talks in Arusha on the issue of the (Armed forces). The talks continued until 1900. What could be said however is that in Arusha—on the RPF side as well as on that of the observers and certain Rwandan delegates—one wonders whether [words indistinct] Kigali to break the deadlock. [end recording]

Uganda

'Top' UPA Rebel Commander Killed

AB2511165292 Paris AFP in English 1629 GMT 25
Nov 92

[Text] Kampala, Nov 25 (AFP)—Rebel Uganda People's Army's (UPA) sole surviving commander, Major Stephen Moi, was killed in a shootout with government forces on Monday in northeastern Uganda's Kumi District, the official NEW VISION newspaper reported Wednesday [25 November].

The paper said the rebel leader was wounded in a shoot with National Resistance Army (NRA) troops at Garama village in Bukedea County on Monday morning and died as he was being carried in a wheelbarrow to hospital.

The paper quoted NRA unit commander that killed him, Lieutenant Stephen Akutta, as saying that a shootout ensued when the rebels opened fire on the NRA unit pursuing them and wounding one soldier, but the pursuing soldiers managed to shoot Moi in the neck.

The remaining rebels fled in disarray thereafter and were seen dragging along a wounded victim. Moi was found writhing in agony and bleeding profusely from a bullet wound in the neck by a nearby bush.

He was picked up by the NRA and after brief interrogation was transported on a wheelbarrow, but died before arriving in hospital.

Moi was an officer under dictator Idi Amin's regime and served at commander of Kabamba military training school in western Uganda.

He formed a rebel group during the insurgency in northern Uganda that later merged with the rebel Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA). Last year,

he crossed to the northeastern districts of Soroti and Kumi to join the UPA, where he has been the brain behind rebel activities in Kumi.

Last month, another UPA commander, Nathan Ikuret, was killed by the NRA, while three months ago rebel field commander Hitler Eregu fled the country into exile.

President's Office Issues Statement on Transition

*MB2611211592 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2032 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by the South African Communication Service: "Statement by President F.W. de Klerk On the Timetable for Further Constitutional Reform"]

[Text] The main question in our national debate on further constitutional reform now centres on the timing of the process which will lead to the installation of a government of national unity. The government has received numerous queries and representations in this regard from persons and organisation inside South Africa and abroad.

Against the background set out in the attached position paper the government considers it in the best interest of the country that a fully representative government of national unity should be in place no later than the first half of 1994. Such a government would function in terms of a transitional constitution which would inter alia provide for an elected parliament and executive.

However, the timing of the installation of the government of national unity cannot be determined in isolation from the process which must necessarily precede it. Before this can happen, a number of steps must first be successfully completed in accordance with the broad consensus which has already been reached regarding the transitional process.

Against this background, the government is convinced that the following objectives and target time scales are attainable, and given the co-operation of all parties can even be advanced, and should therefore be vigorously pursued:

Bilateral discussions across a broad spectrum of political parties, aimed at the resumption of negotiations, whether in a new forum or in a more representative and restructured Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa], to be completed before: end of February 1993;

Such a multilateral negotiating forum to be convened before: end of March 1993;

Multilateral agreements on a transitional constitution (including constitution-making procedures, constitutional principles and regional governments), transitional executive council and election commission to be concluded before: end of May 1993;

Legislation for transitional executive council and election commission to be adopted in: May/June 1993;

Transitional executive council and election commission to be instituted in: June 1993;

Transitional constitution (also providing for a constitution-making body) to be enacted before: end of September 1993;

Election rules and regulations to be formulated and promulgated before: end of October 1993;

Playing field to be levelled; free political participation to be ensured; violence to be contained; party political campaigns to be organised and concluded; logistical preparations to be made and voter information campaigns to be conducted for elections to be held not later than: March/April 1994.

Naturally, our ability to meet these target dates will depend on the co-operation of the other major parties and their commitment to the process. However, if we are able to make rapid progress in dealing with abovementioned steps, it may be possible to establish the government of national unity earlier than envisaged.

On the other hand, failure to reach inclusive agreements on transitional measures within the envisaged time frames will inevitably delay the institution of a government of national unity and exacerbate the country's political, economic and social problems. Should this happen, other ways and means will have to be found to bring about a government of national unity so that constitutional reform continues without delay.

We urge all political parties to co-operate in the quest for a just and prosperous new South Africa. Issued by the Office of the State President Pretoria 26 November 1992

Minister on Transition Timetable

*MB2611205492 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in English 1830 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[Interview with Roelf Meyer, constitutional development and communications minister, by SABC political analyst Lester Venter in the Johannesburg studio; from the "Agenda" program—live]

[Text] [SABC presenter Penny Smythe] President F.W. de Klerk today called for a nonracial general election to be held by April 1994, and at a news conference this afternoon spelt out the government's timetable for full democracy including a restart of multiparty negotiations by March 1993. Discussing these latest announcements are the minister of constitutional development and communications, Mr. Roelf Meyer, and political correspondent Lester Venter.

[Venter] Thank you Penny. Good evening, Mr. Meyer.

[Meyer] Good evening.

[Venter] Mr. Meyer, the term, a government of national unity, is replacing what one is used to hearing, an interim government. What is the change of terminology signifying in terms of a change in ideas?

[Meyer] It would basically still be the same thing. But I think the indication, through using the term, government of national unity, I believe is actually an indication of a greater pluralization of the fact that we have to work together in South Africa. That the various political parties actually realize that we have no alternative but to

cooperate in some or other way to find unity and to govern the country in such a way, at least, during the transitional phase.

[Venter] I see. But specifically, when you talk about working together, how would that idea be actually applied when a government is created?

[Meyer] Well, the government of national unity in a transitional stage can only come about after the first general election, of course. So, it will depend on the outcome of that election, and it will be composed upon that election. In other words, parties who have significant support after such an election will be represented in the government.

[Venter] And when you say represented in the government, would that representation, or shared representation, go all the way up to the cabinet, perhaps?

[Meyer] Indeed, what we have outlined in our documents today provides for not only a government of national unity, in other words, at the executive level, but also at the legislative level. But this again, I would like to emphasize, would come about on account of provisions being made for that in a transitional constitution. Now this must, of course, first be negotiated through multiparty negotiations then be implemented through an enactment of Parliament, and then of course the election.

[Venter] I'd like to come to that problem of a transitional constitution in a moment, but when you're talking about the parties sharing power right up into the cabinet—and by the way, hasn't there been any talk of the idea of a rotating presidency during that timeframe?

[Meyer] The government and the National Party's proposal in this regard is still the same; namely, that we should have at the executive level powersharing, and that this should be brought about on account of an election for the post of president, and that the persons who would achieve the most votes in such an election should form jointly the presidency of the country during the transition.

[Venter] I see. Has there been any feedback from your negotiating adversary, the ANC [African National Congress], on that idea of a composite presidency?

[Meyer] Well, let's put it this way, they have a different proposal. When it comes to negotiating that we will obviously put our proposal against theirs. And through negotiations, I believe, we will be able to sort it out. The basic point, I think—what one can register at this stage—is that it is quite clear that there is acceptance of the fact that also, especially during the transition, but also thereafter, there should be powersharing in South Africa. The model or the mechanism that we should use for that is something that has to be negotiated.

[Venter] Before we leave this point, when we're talking about sharing power and responsibility right up into the Cabinet under a government of national unity, is that the essential difference between that and the interim government idea that was talked off up until now? In other

words, where under the interim government idea that pertained up until now, there wouldn't be that sharing at the cabinet level?

[Meyer] It's quite clear that the ANC departed completely from that different point of view, and I think what we are seeing at the moment is that there is a convergence of opinion growing at least, although there would still be different emphasis, as far as their concept of powersharing is concerned, than ours. I think there is a growing realization again of the fact that we have to move closer to the point where we can actually cooperate and work jointly. But I must emphasize, and this is very important, that powersharing can't come about only on account of a deal or an agreement between government and the ANC. Powersharing must come about on account of multiparty negotiations and agreements in that regard.

[Venter] On that point there seems to be a shift in the emphasis on the style of negotiations, both from what the president has said today, and what Mr. Mandela said yesterday, in that there seems to be more an emphasis now on extensive bilateral negotiations; that is, one-to-one discussions between the parties before full multilateral negotiations, as one saw in Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa]. Is that correct?

[Meyer] Well, the problem of course is the fact that we are still struggling to get multiparty negotiations off the ground again. You must remember it was brought to a standstill in May this year, and after that we had a number of months through which we had to try and convince the ANC to come back to the multiparty negotiating table. They finally decided to do so. Now we have some other problems inter alia with the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party], and what we are dealing with at the moment is to try and get all the parties back to multiparty negotiations through various bilateral talks. And we are talking to all parties at the moment with a view to achieve exactly that.

[Venter] Do you not fear that you are going to exacerbate that problem by placing emphasis—even though you don't have any choice—to place that emphasis on bilateral talks, and one is referring to the sort of problem that was encountered, that after the Record of Understanding, Chief Minister Buthelezi made objection to the Record of Understanding and not being party to that, how do the two big parties plan to bring their allies into the process?

[Meyer] Well, I wouldn't say, that in the first instance, I think it would be incorrect to deduct that the IFP is an ally of the government or the National Party, as such. IFP is playing its own role in the political scene in South Africa. It's taking its own points of view, and for that reason government is bilaterally talking to them. I want to emphasize again, as we do with other parties. But the point is that we have to work towards removing whatever obstacles still remain with various participants, so that we can actually work together, and bring all the parties to the joint negotiating table.

In the meantime it is also of importance, however, to start focussing on matters like preparing for the transitional stage, and of course, what will follow, the transitional constitution, and thereafter the election. What we have outlined today, and I think this is important, is to create a greater focus on what must be done to get to the point of the implementation of transitional government of national unity. People might think that it is just an easy step to get there, but we've tried, through the process that we have outlined today, to ensure that there is a clear picture of what has to be achieved in the meantime. And unless we get all the parties cooperating towards achieving this goal, there will be problems still to get to that point within the time scale that we've outlined.

[Venter] Let's talk about those problems. A transitional constitution still has to be agreed upon before all these developments that all South Africans share or hope will actually transpire, can be arrived at. The transitional constitution is in fact just the problem, and a failure to agree on that is what tripped Codesa up in May. Why are there better prospects now—if you believe that there are—then they were in May?

[Meyer] Before I focus on that let me just point out that the first obstacle, so to speak, that we will have to get across, would be actually to get all the parties to the table. We hope to achieve that by February next year. Then we can start the process of concentrating our negotiations in that multiparty negotiating forum on inter alia, the transitional constitution. I believe the problems that we have experienced in the past in that regard can be overcome, inter alia by focussing on the real issues that are at stake.

For instance, at Codesa II, the problem came about, or the issue that brought the problem was actually the one of the so-called percentages. I believe that can be overcome if we, for instance, concentrate on what the real issue in that regard would be, and that would be, for instance, the question of regionalism. In other words, we must determine and focus our minds on that particular issue, and I believe if we can sort that out, if we can find solutions to that then the other problems will also come into place, and we will be able to find easy solutions then.

[Venter] Are you going to attempt to arrive at that agreement on regionalism, for example between yourselves and the ANC before you go into the multilateral negotiations?

[Meyer] We will certainly look at an opportunity to talk to the ANC on the subject. They have recently published a document. We have already earlier during September published our own document on the issue. And looking at it from both perspectives, although there are still huge gaps in terms of this documents, we also believe that there is a lot of common ground for talking, and we are prepared to do so bilaterally with the ANC, and that we are looking at closing that gap and see how we can resolve the difference.

[Venter] Mr. Meyer, thank you very much.

Well, that then is the government's view on the road ahead. Now we'll be tackling similar issues and the ANC's view of those on December the 10th, when we have on our agenda schedule and interview with the ANC's leader, Mr. Nelson Mandela.

ANC Responds

*MB2611213092 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2102 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by the African National Congress [ANC] on 26 November 1992: "ANC Press Statement in Response to De Klerk's Proposed Timetable"]

[Text] The timetable leading to elections for a constituent assembly that has been proposed by President F.W. de Klerk is totally unacceptable.

South Africa cannot afford any delay in the process. The economy cannot sustain a further year of corruption and mismanagement; the people will no longer tolerate lack of governance or the increasing uncertainty that will clearly be accompanied by escalating violence, growing unemployment and deteriorating of socio-economic conditions.

The ANC [African National Congress] will be holding an extensive bilateral meeting with the National Party soon, where all these issues are to be discussed. It is unfortunate that President de Klerk has seen fit to make pronouncements on issues that are the very subject for discussion at a meeting that has taken months to prepare for.

The ANC wants an election during 1993, almost a full year earlier than the government envisages.

The ANC's negotiations commission is scheduled to meet tomorrow morning, and will make a full statement on completion of their deliberations. Issued by: the Department of Information and Publicity, P.O. Box 61884, Marshalltown 2107, Johannesburg.

ANC's Jordan Reacts

*MB2611194892 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in English 1800 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[Text] The State President's announcement on elections and negotiations has drawn sharp criticism from the ANC [African National Congress]. The ANC's information chief, Pallo Jordan, accused the government of further delaying the process of transition. Dr. Jordan said the ANC would have preferred that decisions such as these were made multilaterally. He said it was his organization's view that what he called a protracted transition would ill serve South Africa.

ANC's Niehaus Interviewed

*MB2711110992 London BBC World Service in English
0330 GMT 27 Nov 92*

[Telephone interview with African National Congress spokesman Carl Niehaus by BBC correspondent Christopher Wade on the "Network Africa" program—recorded]

[Text] As you may have heard in the news, President F.W. de Klerk yesterday, in Pretoria, laid out for the first time his timetable for the first multiracial elections in that country. These elections are to be for an interim government which will end white minority rule.

[Begin De Klerk recording] The government considers it in the best interest of the country that a fully representative government of national unity should be in place no later than the first half of 1994. [end recording]

President de Klerk has also made it clear that an elected interim government is virtually certain to include his own National Party, the African National Congress [ANC], the Inkatha Freedom Party and other parties, all having a voice in decision-making.

[Begin De Klerk recording] We do not envisage handing over government piece by piece. This government will continue to govern, until [changes thought] in terms of a constitutional process, a new government of national unity is installed. [end recording]

So for the first time President de Klerk has established a deadline for South Africa's 30 million black majority to go to the polls for the final stage in the dismantling of apartheid. But between now and the suggested April 1994 deadline, the president listed a complex schedule of events which will all have to go through if his proposed schedule is to work. First, the bilateral negotiations now taking place between the parties will have to be concluded by February 1993 followed by multiparty conferences in March to approve the bilateral agreements. One agreement has been reached on an administrative interim government by June, leaving 9 months to prepare for the elections to a multiracial interim government. But despite what still looks like an ambitious timetable the ANC has announced that it is dissatisfied with the president's proposals. Christopher Wade rang up the official spokesman Carl Niehaus to find out why.

[Begin recording] [Niehaus] Well the timetable leading to elections for a constituent assembly that has been proposed by President de Klerk is totally unacceptable for the ANC. We want elections during 1993 which is almost a full year earlier than what President De Klerk envisages. The African National Congress believes that we cannot afford a delay of this kind in South Africa. The economy cannot sustain a further year of corruption and of mismanagement and the people will no longer tolerate lack of governance or the increasing uncertainty that will clearly be accompanied by escalating violence, the growing unemployment rate and deteriorating of social economic conditions.

[Wade] This may look to some people like bad faith on the part of the ANC. It certainly looks as though President De Klerk has made a major concession here.

[Niehaus] Well President de Klerk hasn't really made a major concession. He, anyhow, will have to face the situation where his own period for which he's been elected will come to an end in 1994. So what we're

looking at in terms of this proposal is that he is simply tallying the concept of elections for a (?full) and nonracial democracy with a time when he will not be able to continue with the mandate that he has within the racist parliament, that at least at this stage, exists.

[Wade] I understand you've issued an official statement which says that the ANC will be holding an extensive bilateral meeting with the National Party very soon. Exactly what proposals are you going to be putting on the table?

[Niehaus] The proposals that we will put on the table is that there can be elections in the latter half of 1993 for a constituent assembly. We will also propose that it should be possible to have the first phase of an interim government of national unity in place considerably earlier than that, so that during the first six months of next year it should be possible to level the playing field to prepare the proper conditions for those elections for a constituent assembly and we have already issued a Transition to Democracy Act which indicates how we hope that the constituent assembly will function, which indicated that constituent assembly will also function as a legislature and that any party which got more than 5 percent representation in the constituent assembly will be able to serve on the executive of the legislature, which means that through the structure that we propose there will be an interim government of national unity, and obviously, we will also have to deal at the bilaterals coming up, hopefully early next month, with the outstanding questions of violence and how we can add to the efforts that are already being made in the National Peace Accord to bring the violence to an end.

[Wade] Are you not at all concerned that this might look to both South Africans, whom you want eventually to vote for you in any elections, and to people outside South Africa, rather like sour grapes, that what you are really upset about is that De Klerk's party has seized the initiative on the timetable for the elections from the ANC?

[Niehaus] No, we have said very clearly, when Mr. Mandela spoke last weekend, that we would like to see a date set very quickly and we wouldn't have minded if that date was a date set within this time span that I've indicated, that we can have elections in 1993. The situation in South Africa and the seriousness of the central and economic crisis that we are faced with, demands from us not to get involved simply in this kind of politicking or possibly sour grapes response. [end recording]

CP: 'Unattainable Goal'

MB2711124092 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1141 GMT 27 Nov 92

[Text] Pretoria Nov 27 SAPA—The government's transitional time-scale constituted an unattainable goal, Conservative Party [CP] leader Andries Treurnicht said on Friday. Reacting to President F.W. de Klerk's announcement that he wanted a government of national unity by 1994, Dr. Treurnicht said that such a government, for

different nations which demanded self-determination, would not succeed or come about in South Africa. The African National Congress' [ANC] intended "socialist and communist straight-jacket" for the country was a nightmare, and could not be made acceptable through negotiations. "One democracy for the voters of 13 nations and groups on a single voter's roll is no democracy but constitutes a serious disregard of nations' right to freedom," Dr. Treurnicht said. "Therefore a single constitution can never be acceptable for the self-determination of different nations."

The CP, he said, was in favour of an alternative forum whose points of departure should be the acceptance of Christian values, the rejection of communism and any form of ANC domination, and the recognition of nation's full freedom and right to self-determination. The CP considered it presumptuous to accept a single government of so-called national unity, one election for all nations' voters, and one constitution for different nations as a point of departure for a time-scale, even before these principles had in any way been cleared with those concerned, he said. "The state president knows from experience gained during the past year how dangerous it is for him to negotiate successfully within specific time-scales," Dr. Treurnicht said. "He would have to capitulate totally to the demands of the ANC to keep to his time-scale."

'Background Paper'

MB2711055892 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2040 GMT 26 Nov 92

[SAPA PR wire service issued by the South African Communication Service: "Background Paper: Annexure to the Statement by State President F.W. de Klerk on the Timetable for Further Constitutional Reform"]

[Text] The present government, on coming to power on 6 September 1989, initiated an accelerated reform process to eliminate apartheid and lead the country through peaceful negotiations to a new democratic constitutional dispensation. This process was launched on 2 February 1990.

We have removed the pillars of apartheid. All political organisations are now free to participate in the negotiation process. Negotiations progressed to the multi-party level at Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa], which, with a few exceptions, included most of the significant parties. After Codesa II a number of parties withdrew from this process.

Many of the original Codesa participants are ready to return to multi-party negotiations. Others are holding back, while a number of those not previously involved now wish to participate.

The government has worked ceaselessly to get multi-party negotiations back on track. For this purpose, it has been engaged in bilateral discussions with a number of parties. This has led to a perception among some of the parties that the government and the ANC [African

National Congress] are dominating the process to the exclusion of others. There have even been media reports of a prospective power-sharing deal between the government and the ANC. The government has always been in favour of multi-party power-sharing, but feels strongly that this cannot come about as a result of agreement between only two parties.

Power-sharing, as a democratic principle, is particularly relevant to South Africa. In practice it means that the party that gains fifty-one per cent of the vote should not obtain one hundred per cent of the power at all levels of government. There is a growing awareness that it will be difficult for any one party to govern South Africa effectively. The immense challenge of national reconciliation and reconstruction can be successfully carried out only with the co-operation of all leading parties. Their involvement is a prerequisite for peace and stability. To us power-sharing is a constitutional support will have meaningful participation in all areas of government at all levels. A government of national unity is accordingly becoming a key concept. The negotiation process has already produced broad consensus on this approach. To achieve this objective, we propose a constitution:

- giving all parties with significant support participation in the legislature, and all those with major support participation in the executive;
- providing for autonomous, original and constitutionally protected powers in respect of agreed functions at regional and local government level where party support may be relatively different from that at national level;
- transforming South Africa into a state in which the Constitution is the supreme law and a justiciable charter of fundamental rights protects the citizen against abuse of state power;
- containing further checks and balances such as increased majorities, entrenched clauses, cooling-off periods and dispute resolution mechanisms to prevent simple majorities from riding roughshod over minorities;
- ensuring and protecting the independence of the courts, of judges and of attorneys-general;
- placing the Armed Forces under neutral, non-partisan control to ensure that they cannot be abused for party political ends and defend the constitution and the borders of the country and protect our citizens;
- ensuring and protecting the independence of institutions such as the auditor-general, the ombudsman and the commission responsible for the public service; and
- providing the framework for an economic and social system;
- safeguarding economic freedom, private ownership and a market economy and allowing the maximum scope for individual initiative and private enterprise;

- ensuring equal development opportunities for all; and
- addressing socio-economic needs and backlogs in the most effective and constructive way.

While these are salient features of the democratic constitution that the government and the National Party will support and promote in the negotiations and elections, the government also has a responsibility in respect of the process itself. In this process, leading to an election, other parties, large and small, must have an equal opportunity to promote their particular constitutional policies.

The immediate and urgent objective remains free and fair elections as soon as possible under transitional constitutional arrangements negotiated, accepted and supported by all significant parties. To this end, the government had hoped that the process it launched in 1990 would lead the country away from violent political conflict towards a just society with normalised free party political competition and participation. Violence delays progress along the road to constitutional reform.

For elections to be free and fair, it is inconceivable that political parties should have private armies. In the final analysis, only recognised political parties should participate in the political process to ensure a climate conducive to free and fair political participation.

This situation has not yet been achieved. Political violence and intolerance are destabilising our country and frustrating the negotiation process. The government itself and many other institutions, parties and individuals have been working hard to bring an end to violence. Much must still be done. This requires that our people and our leaders must come out openly in full support of political tolerance and reconciliation if peace is to be attained.

While free and fair elections would hardly be possible if violence were to continue at the present level, meaningful progress in negotiations is necessary to eliminate political violence. Pretoria 26 November 1992

ANC Adopts 'Strategic Perspective' Paper

*MB2511133892 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1316 GMT 25 Nov 92*

[Text] Durban Nov 25 SAPA—The African National Congress [ANC] has adopted an amended position paper entitled "Negotiations: A Strategic Perspective" which considers the establishment of a government of national unity after the adoption of a new constitution.

This emerged at a media briefing at the end of the ANC's three-day National Executive Committee [NEC] meeting in Durban on Wednesday [25 November].

The document was initially drawn up by SA Communist Party Chairman Joe Slovo and proposed concessions on power sharing. An amended paper was adopted during the NEC meeting.

The adoption of the document was designed to chart the way forward for negotiations which would enable a peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy, ANC spokesman Mac Maharaj told reporters.

The paper notes that "even after the adoption of a new constitution, the balance of forces, and the interests of the country as a whole may still require of us to consider the establishment of a government of national unity—provided that it does not delay or obstruct the process of orderly transition to majority rule".

This approach was fundamentally different to that of the government which sought to entrench veto powers for minority parties on the basis of a constitutionally-enforced coalition. This frustrated the will and aspirations of the majority, said Mr. Maharaj.

Other issues which emerged at the media briefing were an announcement by ANC President Nelson Mandela that a channel would be established between the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] to prepare for a bilateral summit.

This could address conditions both sides had set for such a meeting, said Mr. Mandela.

No date had been set for such a meeting and this would be discussed during preparatory deliberations between the parties.

On violence, an NEC statement said the meeting expressed concern that despite efforts by the National Peace Accord process and the exposure of the involvement of state agencies in violence, killings continued.

Central to ways of ending the carnage was the need for the democratic movement to "exercise relentless pressure on the government to acknowledge its responsibility, to act decisively against all perpetrators of violence including elements within state structures".

The NEC rejected the National Party's view that violence made it impossible for democratic elections to take place.

This encouraged the perpetrators of violence and those opposed to a negotiated solution, based on democratic elections.

"In essence, that view enables the perpetrators of violence to hold the future of our country to ransom," said the statement.

The NEC further endorsed a top level peace meeting in Natal to try to stop the war there and committed itself to initiatives aimed at securing peace and free political activity in Ciskei and Bophuthatswana homelands.

The decision by the National Peace Committee to urgently convene a meeting of the peace accord's signatories to review the peace process was also welcomed by the NEC, which said it was ready to co-operate in setting a date.

With regards to proposals made by the commission of inquiry into the treatment of former detainees in ANC camps, the NEC established an independent commission to inquire into this.

The commission would be composed of Margaret Burnham from the USA, Dr. David Zamchiya from Zimbabwe and Dr. Samuel Mokgethi Motsuenyane of South Africa.

The commission's terms of reference are in the process of finalisation by the ANC's National Working Committee, the NEC statement said.

Meanwhile, on time frames regarding negotiations, Mr. Mandela said an interim government of national unity should be in place within the next eight to 12 months.

However, Mr. Mandela stressed it was important the ANC and the government agree on common positions on major national issues before taking these to multi-lateral negotiations.

The ANC was not forcing its position on any party but wanted to present proposals agreed to with the government as recommendations.

The ANC rejected the government's, and "other black groups", calls that major decisions on negotiations and related issues should be decided on by only three parties.

"We rejected this. We want all political parties to make these decisions."

On the issue of democratic elections, ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa said his organisation would do all in its power to ensure these take place within the next nine to 12 months.

"It is possible to achieve this by next year," he said.

Questioned on whether the NEC would endorse a call by the ANC's Natal regions for an international peace keeping force to be sent to the country, Mr. Ramaphosa said the National Working Committee would investigate this more fully before making an announcement.

'Negotiations: A Strategic Perspective'

MB2711054392 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1522 GMT 26 Nov 92

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by the African National Congress: "Negotiations: A Strategic Perspective"—(as adopted by the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on 25 November, 1992)]

[Text] The strategic perspective of the ANC [African National Congress] is the transfer of power from the white minority regime to the people as a whole. This will usher in a new era characterised by the complete eradication of the system of apartheid, fundamental socio-economic transformation, peace and stability for all our people. The basic principle underpinning this new order is democratic majority rule.

1. Balance of Forces

By the end of the eighties, the strategic balance of forces was characterised by:

1.1 The liberation movement enjoyed many advantages over the regime, both internally and internationally. All the pillars of the struggle had grown from strength to strength:

—a very high level of mass mobilisation and mass defiance had rendered apartheid unworkable;

—the building of the underground had laid a basis for exercising political leadership and was laying a basis for the intensification of the armed struggle;

—the world was united against apartheid.

1.2 at the same time the liberation movement faced certain objective weaknesses:

—changes in southern Africa were making it increasingly difficult for the ANC in the conduct of struggle;

—there was no longer a visible intensification of the armed struggle;

—the international community was making renewed attempts to impose a settlement plan.

1.3 The crisis in Eastern Europe, and the resultant change in the relations between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution of regional conflicts to the fore. In this context, South Africa was not going to be treated as an exception. Importantly, these changes also exerted new pressures on the regime to fall in line with the emerging international "culture" of multi-party democracy.

1.4 The apartheid power bloc was no longer able to rule in the old way. Its policies of repression and reform had failed dismally; and it faced an ever-deepening socio-economic crisis. At the same time the liberation movement did not have the immediate capacity to overthrow the regime.

1.5 All these factors set the stage for a negotiated resolution of the South African conflict. The regime was forced to unban the ANC and other organisations, release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, acknowledge the defeat of the apartheid ideology and seek negotiations with the liberation movement. This constituted a major strategic retreat for the regime and a victory for the democratic forces.

2. Shifts in the Balance of Forces

2.1 The balance of forces is not static. In this phase of the negotiations:

—The regime strives to undermine and weaken the liberation movement through its strategy of low intensity conflict and the beginnings of counter-revolutionary war;

—The liberation movement seeks to weaken the capacity of the regime to act against the people and broaden the space for free political activity through a combination of mass mobilisation, international pressure and self-defence.

2.2 In the recent period:

—The De Klerk regime has suffered a renewed crisis of legitimacy. It continues to fail to win the allegiance of the majority;

—The regime's camp stands more divided than it ever was since the unbanning of the ANC: its unpatriotic front with some bantustans has collapsed; it is increasingly losing the loyalty of the civil service and important elements in the security forces, many of whom are drifting to the extreme right-wing camp; in the October special session of the tri-cameral Parliament, it failed to secure the support of a single other party outside itself; leading members of the party and government continue to jump ship for reasons of "fatigue", "depression" and "disillusionment";

—The regime has lost all ability to arrest the unprecedented socio-economic decline, growing unemployment among both black and white, the general social disintegration and spiraling crime.

However:

—The regime still commands vast state and other military resources;

—It continues to enjoy the support of powerful economic forces;

—Objectively, counter-revolutionary violence and the growing potential of long-term counter-revolutionary instability acts as a resource for the regime.

2.3 Also in the recent period:

—The ANC has established itself as a legal national political organisation;

—It commands the support of the majority of South Africans;

—The liberation movement enjoys the capacity to mobilise large-scale mass action;

—It is able to influence and mobilise the international community.

However:

—The liberation movement suffers many organisational weaknesses;

—It does not command significant military and financial resources;

—It is unable to militarily defeat the counter-revolutionary movement or adequately defend the people.

2.4 As a result of mass action and negotiations, some progress has been made in the recent period. Some examples of these are: the Codesa Declaration of Intent (which establishes national consensus on the broad direction in which the political process should unfold); the Record of Understanding; and broad consensus on the need for an interim government and constituent assembly. Though the regime has succeeded in delaying the transition, there remains a groundswell of support within society as a whole for a speedy resolution of the political and socio-economic problems.

2.5 In this context, the liberation movement is faced with various options:

a) Resumption of the armed struggle and the perspective of revolutionary seizure of power;

b) Mass action and international pressure, within the broad context of negotiations, until the balance of forces is shifted to such an extent that we secure a negotiated surrender from regime;

c) A negotiations process combined with mass action and international pressure which takes into account the need to combat counter-revolutionary forces and at the same time uses phases in the transition to qualitatively change the balance of forces in order to secure a thorough-going democratic transformation.

2.6 These options should be weighed against the following background:

2.6.1 The ANC's National Conference resolved, after weighing various factors—including the possibility of a negotiated resolution of the South African conflict and the objective situation outlined in section 1 above—that the option of armed seizure of power was neither preferable nor viable at that juncture. The current situation does not warrant a review of this decision of national conference.

2.6.2 An approach that aims to secure a negotiated surrender from the regime will entail a protracted process with tremendous cost to the people and the country.

2.7 Taking into account:

—The capacity of the liberation movement;

—The capacity of the regime to endlessly delay while consolidating its hold onto power and restructuring in order to undermine future democratic transformation;

—The cost to the people and the country of a protracted negotiations process;

—The need to as urgently as possible address the dire socio-economic needs of the people;

—The need to prevent a further consolidation of the counter-revolutionary forces;

—The third option, (c), is the most viable and preferable.

2.8 The liberation movement, however, should guard against being captive to a given approach. A combination of factors, including the conduct of the regime may dictate a need to revisit our approach. Apart from the first two options, this may also include a much more enhanced role for the international community in the negotiations process.

3. Negotiations: The Preferred Option of the Liberation Movement

3.1 A peaceful political settlement has always been the first option of the liberation movement. It was only when the prospect of any peaceful settlement vanished that we adopted the perspective of an armed revolutionary seizure of power. On the other hand, for the regime, it was a failure of arms that imposed the obligation to concede the need for a political settlement.

3.2 Negotiations therefore represent a victory for the democratic movement and a defeat for the forces of apartheid.

3.3 Consequently, it must remain one of our strategic tasks to continue to draw the regime onto the terrain of free political activity, peaceful democratic action and genuine negotiations.

3.4 Delays in the process of peaceful transformation are not in the interests of the masses, who seek liberation now, and do not enhance our possibilities to effect the transformation to genuine democracy as effectively and as speedily as we should.

4. Phases of the Democratic Revolution

4.1 Our strategic perspective should take into account that the democratic revolution—for the attainment of majority rule—will proceed in various phases. Our possibilities relevant to each phase should not be pursued in a manner that produces defeats later because of a failure to recognise the dialectical interconnection between various phases.

4.2 This strategic perspective should recognise the following phases, each one of which has its regularities and objective and subjective demands:

Phase 1: The period prior to the establishment of the transitional executive council. (In this phase we should aim to: secure an agreement on free and fair election, interim government and constituent assembly; stop unilateral restructuring; broaden the space for free political activity; and address the issue of violence).

Phase 2: The period from the establishment of the transitional executive council leading up to the election of the constituent assembly and the establishment of an interim government of national unity. (In this phase we should aim to: consolidate peace through joint control over all armed forces; ensure free and fair elections; and mobilise for a decisive victory in the elections).

Phase 3: The period of the drafting and adoption of the new constitution by the constituent assembly. (In this phase we should aim to: establish an interim government in which the ANC would be a major player; adopt a new democratic constitution; and start addressing the socio-economic problems facing the country).

Phase 4: The period of the phasing in of the new constitution, which will include the restructuring of the state machinery and the general dismantling of the system of apartheid.

Phase 5: The period of the consolidation of the process of democratic transformation and reconstruction.

4.3 At all stages, we should consider carefully the balance of forces, how to change that balance, and therefore place ourselves in a position in which we can determine the correct path to follow to further the process of democratic change. In this context, the broad masses should play a decisive role. The process must be mass-driven.

4.4 The balance of forces, our specific objectives and our long-term goals would at each stage dictate the need to: enter into specific, and perhaps changing, alliances; and, make certain compromises in order to protect and advance this process.

5. Goals of the National Liberation Struggle and Our Immediate Objectives:

5.1 The fundamental goal of the national liberation struggle is the transfer of power to the people as a whole and the establishment of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This should not be confused with the immediate objectives we set for ourselves in each phase of the transition. At the same time, we should ensure that the immediate objectives we pursue do not have the effect of blocking our longer-term goals.

5.2 The objectives we set, and can attain in each phase, will depend on the balance of forces.

5.3 We must ensure that in entering a new phase (e.g. the establishment of an interim government) the balance of forces is transformed qualitatively in favour of the democratic movement. Negotiations can therefore result in the possibility of bringing about a radically transformed political framework (i.e. changing the conjuncture) in which the struggle for the achievement of the strategic perspectives of the national democratic revolution will be advanced in more favourable conditions.

5.4 In setting objectives for the present round of negotiations, we must bear in mind that in the main one would not achieve at the table that which one cannot achieve on the ground. Depending on the balance of forces, we might not gain everything we set out to achieve. However, positions we adopt should be informed by our longer-term objectives. Our correct assessment of the balance of forces, the support of the masses and good negotiating tactics should ensure that our gains constitute a decisive leap forward.

5.5 In setting objectives today, our strategy should not focus narrowly on only the initial establishment of democracy, but also (and perhaps more importantly) on how to nurture, develop and consolidate that democracy. Our strategy must at once also focus on ensuring that the new democracy is not undermined.

5.6 Our broad objectives for the first two phases (as distinct from longer term goals) should therefore be:

5.6.1 The establishment of a democratic constitution-making process;

5.6.2 ending the National Party's [NP] monopoly of political power;

5.6.3 ensuring a continuing link between democracy and socio-economic empowerment; and,

5.6.4 minimising the threat to stability and the democratic process.

6. Engaging the National Party Regime

6.1 The objective reality imposes a central role for the ANC and the NP in the transition. The ANC is the custodian of the peace process—while the NP is the party in power. Using various forms of struggle, we must ensure that the regime accepts movement forward in the process.

6.2 This means that the balance of forces has forced onto the South African political situation a relationship between the ANC and the NP characterised by:

—In the first place conflict, in so far as the regime attempts to block the transition; and

—Secondly, constructive interaction in pursuit of agreements the regime has been forced to enter into.

6.3 How to manage this contradiction is one of our challenges of leadership.

7. The Need for a Government of National Unity:

7.1 We have already won the demand for an interim government of national unity.

7.2 However, we also need to accept the fact that even after the adoption of a new constitution, the balance of forces and the interests of the country as a whole may still require of us to consider the establishment of a government of national unity—provided that it does not delay or obstruct the process of orderly transition to majority rule and that the parties that have lost the elections will not be able to paralyse the functioning of government. This is fundamentally different from an approach to power-sharing which entrenches veto powers for minority parties.

7.3 Some objectives of a government of national unity:

7.3.1 Stability during the period of transition to full democracy: the enemies of democracy will try to destabilise the new government and make democracy unworkable.

7.3.2 Commitment to and responsibility for the process: we should seek, especially in the early stages, to commit all parties to actively take part in the process of dismantling apartheid, building democracy and promoting development in the interest of all.

8. Laying the Basis to Minimise the Threat to Stability and Democracy:

8.1 The new democratic government would need to adopt a wide range of measures in order to minimise the potential threat to the new democracy. However, some of these measures may have to be part and parcel of a negotiated settlement. The new government will also need to take into account the need to employ the talents and capacities of all South Africans, as well as the time it will take to implement an urgent programme of advancing the skills of those who have all along been deprived.

8.2 Strategic forces we need to consider right now are the SADF [South African Defense Force], SAP [South African Police], all other armed formations and the civil service in general. If the transition to democracy affects all the individuals in these institutions wholly and purely negatively, then they would serve as fertile ground from which the destabilisers would recruit.

8.3 Not only do these forces have vast potential to destabilise a fledgling democracy in the future, but as importantly, they have the potential to delay the transition for a lengthy period of time or even make serious attempts to subvert the transition.

8.4 A democratic government will need to restructure the civil service and the security forces in order to ensure that:

—They are professional, competent and accountable;

—They are representative of society as whole (including through the application of the principle of affirmative action);

—They serve the interests of democracy; and

—The size of these institutions is determined by the objective needs of the country.

In this process it may be necessary to address the question of job security, retrenchment packages and a general amnesty based on disclosure and justice, at some stage, as part of a negotiated settlement. These measures will need to apply to all armed formations and sections of the civil service. However, the availability of resources and experiences of other countries need to be taken into account.

8.5 It is also necessary to consider other potential counter-revolutionary forces and find ways of engaging them and their mass base in the national effort to build a democratic society.

8.6 One of the basic guarantees to stability will be the implementation of development programmes to meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the majority of South Africans. This places a serious responsibility on the ANC to determine priorities and possibilities for democratic socio-economic transformation.

9. Reaching the Negotiated Settlement

9.1 Some elements of the final negotiated settlement would take the form of multi-lateral (Codesa-type) agreements. Other elements of the settlement package would take the form of bilateral agreements between the ANC and the NP—such agreements would bind the two parties.

9.2 The thorny question of the powers, functions and boundaries of regions in a new South Africa may be an issue on which we would enter into bilateral discussion with the NP and other parties, and seek to reach an understanding which the parties would pursue in the constituent assembly.

9.3 The question of a government of national unity after the adoption of a new constitution, and the future of members of the security forces and the civil service could be dealt with through direct engagement with these forces, as part of a bilateral agreement or in multi-lateral agreements.

25 November 1992.

Further on Mandela, Buthelezi Meeting Prospects

Mandela Discusses Meeting

MB2511203392 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in Afrikaans 1800 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] At a news conference in Durban today, after the ANC's [African National Congress] National Executive Committee meeting, Mr. Nelson Mandela referred to the bilateral talks between the ANC and the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party]:

[Begin recording] [SABC reporter Jannie van Rensburg] Mr. Nelson Mandela, the president of the ANC, said that a four-man committee had been set up to prepare for bilateral talks with the IFP. He said that the National Executive Committee had already decided that the ANC should meet with all political parties in the country. The only condition was that thorough preparatory work for such a meeting should be done to ensure that it would be fruitful.

[Mandela in English] And what we have decided today is that we would have this (?channel) in order to reconcile these conditions and to make sure that when a meeting takes place between the IFP and the ANC, that meeting will be fruitful.

[Van Rensburg] Regarding negotiations in general, Mr. Mandela said that it was crucial to have an elected interim government of national unity as soon as possible.

[Mandela in English] It is possible to install such a mechanism of government within the next nine to 12 months. [end recording]

Mandela Firm on Preconditions

MB2611142592 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1410 GMT 26 Nov 92

[Text] Gaborone Nov 26 SAPA—ANC [African National Congress] President Nelson Mandela has reiterated his position that he will only meet his archrival IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi if certain conditions are met.

Speaking at a press conference in the Botswana capital of Gaborone on Thursday [26 November], the ANC president said a meeting with Chief Buthelezi would serve no purpose "unless it was certain that it would produce results in addressing the question of violence".

He said Chief Buthelezi had posed certain conditions for the meeting, and "I have also put conditions".

"These are:

- climates of free political activity in kwaZulu, and the ANC should be allowed to operate there; and,
- there is something hollow in his claim that he is committed to peace when his followers march through the cities armed with weapons of death, heightening the tension.

"Therefore, his followers must be disarmed. He (Chief Buthelezi) must agree to the banning of the public display of weapons and the hostels should be fenced off and regular searches conducted because the hit squads operate from there."

Mr. Mandela said the ANC would have discussions "to get these conditions reconciled and implemented".

Asked whether he considered State President F W de Klerk and Chief Buthelezi men of integrity, Mr. Mandela said: "We are put together in the same country. The three of us have a collective responsibility to resolve the problems, whether we like each other or not."

Mr. Mandela conceded that no progress towards a new political dispensation could be made without the cooperation of the SA Government.

There would soon be a six or seven-day meeting in the bush with the government, he confirmed.

Present opinion polls showed the ANC would have an overall majority in a general election, but "the ANC would only hold office, not grip the levers of power", Mr. Mandela said.

He said the first government elected by all South Africans must be seen as a government of national unity.

"We may have to invite other political parties to be in government to ensure stability, and we may share power with those who have lost.

"We could have a rebellion if we threw the civil service and security forces into the street. We must calculate the support of these services very carefully," said Mr. Mandela.

Daily Notes Discontent in Army, Police Force

MB2511120892 Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans
22 Nov 92 p 4

[Report by RAPPORT political correspondent: "Goldstone: Questions on Foreigners"]

[Text] Fur can still fly over the two foreign members of the Goldstone investigation team who took part in the raid on the Military Intelligence offices in Johannesburg.

On Friday [20 November] evening, Defense Minister Gene Louw expressed his dissatisfaction with this procedure during a certificate award function at the University of South Africa.

"In cases where it is found necessary to enter buildings, I expect that all people involved in the investigations should be sworn to secrecy. With the recent investigation at the Directorate of Covert Collection [DCC] premises, the investigating commission's team could unfortunately not be stopped from entering the premises of the DCC, where highly secret information on the security of the country is being kept. It cannot and may not happen," the minister said.

In political circles, it is also being very briskly discussed as to who in fact gave the tipoff which led to the raid. Questions are also being asked whether details of the raid's discoveries had leaked out before Monday's news conference to people outside government circles.

In any case, there is a strong perception of discontent in government circles—not only because of the the black cloud of covert actions over the South African security forces, but also because of the actions by the Goldstone Commission.

The great haste to hold the news conference, the statements which later had to be corrected—among others that Mr. Roelf Meyer would have fired Ferdi Barnard—and the fact that it was not mentioned that the Barnard plan had not been accepted by MI, are only but a few of the objections.

RAPPORT was told that Judge Goldstone's wide powers enabled him to enter a building, where he could confiscate files, and even seal off the building.

Nevertheless, many politicians feel that the Goldstone Commission has to a duty to perform.

Karin Brynard reports that State President De Klerk reacted almost immediately to the Goldstone revelations. [passage omitted covered by referent item]

According to reports, there is grave dissatisfaction among senior members of both the police as well as the army over the "cleaning up" actions "enforced by politicians".

And on Thursday's National Party caucus meeting in Cape Town, sharp words were used concerning the poor image that the South African Government has recently acquired with the public.

According to reports, it has been suggested that the government's communication program be drastically jacked up.

Number of Emigrants Up By 27 Percent

MB2511163392 Johannesburg Afrikaans Stereo Radio Network in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] There is concern about the large number of people leaving South Africa permanently. The Central Statistics Service said that there had been an increase of nearly 27 percent in the number of people who had emigrated from South Africa in August compared to the same period last year. There was, however, a net gain of 2,500 people between January and August, but the gain was less than half of the 5,700 in the corresponding period last year.

26 November Review of Current Events, Issues

MB2611183692

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

'This Time, Show Results'—"Essential as it was for President de Klerk to reassure the public that he was not bent on a corruption cover-up, visible action must follow his easy words," begins a page 28 editorial in the Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 26 November. "The days are long past when the president could simply make a promise and expect it to be believed. His credibility is too dented for that." "He is fatally trapped between the rock of his intent and the hard place of the sinister elements in his security forces. His commitment this week to 'cut deeply' echoes the promise made three years ago, almost to the day, when he said he would 'cut to the bone'." To show that he is making good on his promise made three years ago, De Klerk cites the disbanding of the Civil Cooperation Bureau, CCB, the Ellison Kahn Committee, and the "full support" of his government and security forces. Yet, after the disbanding of the CCB, the "equally curiously named Directorate of Covert Collections [DCC]" "emerged from the same lair." "What, save an initial or two, is the difference? And what other alphabetical monsters still lurk?" As for the Kahn Committee, "it was able to learn only what securocrats cared to tell it." Regarding the

claim to top-level government support, "he is still surrounded by suspect generals who won't tell him anything. Oh yes, and Cabinet ministers who specialise in not knowing what is going on in their departments." "This time, the public is entitled to hold De Klerk to his word."

'The Late Show'—In an second editorial on the same page, THE STAR states: "It has taken alot of huffing and shoving to achieve what should have happened long ago: a summit between Nelson Mandela and Mangosuthu Buthelezi." While Mandela and Buthelezi lay down conditions for meeting, "hundreds of people were dying in violence between party adherents. While Rome burned, the Neros fiddled."

BUSINESS DAY

Negotiations Developments—"The main political players therefore owe it to themselves and the country as a whole to tread carefully, and to take account of each other's sensitivities, however irrational these may seem at times," states the Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 26 November on page 12. "In the early days of negotiations the ANC [African National Congress] used to talk about a two-sided negotiating table—the ANC-led patriotic front versus the government and its allies. The reality today is that the table has taken on a triangular shape—with an informal alliance of Inkatha, a few other homelands and the white Right occupying the third side. There is good reason for the major parties to seek as much common ground among themselves as possible before multilateral talks resume. But this now requires that the new shape of negotiations be recognised, and the Inkatha-led group be brought into these preparations. If not, those negotiations will be stymied before they even begin."

SOWETAN

Mandela, Buthelezi Meeting—"The willingness now of the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party to meet must be highly commended," states the Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 26 November on page 14. However, "it will be naive to assume that such a bilateral meeting will lead to an immediate cessation of the violence." "The role of the chairman of the National Peace Accord, Mr John Hall, must also not be overlooked. It seems that his exhaustive 'shuttle diplomacy' has paid off. The negotiations process is also likely to benefit from these developments. We have no illusions, however. There are still major obstacles ahead."

27 November Review

MB2711143292

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

Police Perceived as Oppressors—"Something is seriously wrong with a society when as many as 205 policemen are killed on duty in less than a year,"

declares a page 16 editorial in Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 27 November. Policemen are still "seen as oppressors." "It is impossible to change attitudes overnight. Yet the police do have it in their power to alter these inherited perceptions."

BUSINESS DAY

Alternation Between Negotiations Ecstasy, Despair—"After nearly two years of alternating between ecstasy and despair, those with volatile political temperaments face probably two more years of the same," says a page 14 editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 27 November. Nevertheless, "progress is being made; we are not where we were two years ago. We will, if President de Klerk's timetable works out, be much further ahead two years hence. There will be more ecstasy and much more despair, but those are only comments on progress or lack of it. What to look for, and what will drag us forward, is a grim determination to succeed."

SOWETAN

Racial Bias in State Drought Relief Allocation—Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 27 November in a page 10 editorial urges the reader to "ignore Government denials that there is no racial bias in allocating drought relief." The Government has spent close to R[and]200 million in drought relief for the homelands, coloured and Indian communities, and for blacks in the rural areas. On the other hand it spent R800 million in drought relief for farmers. "The government is "discriminating" when it "pours billions into what has become an unproductive sector of the economy at the expense of thousands of black farm workers and black farmers."

THE WEEKLY MAIL

Government, ANC Contrast in Handling Abuses of Past—"Having dropped the notion that the African National Congress [ANC] is entirely evil, the government is trying to push the idea that it is at least as bad as the National Party," states Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English for 27 November-3 December in a page 14 editorial. However, De Klerk "misses a crucial point: the contrast between the way the ANC and the government are handling the abuses of the past. De Klerk has dilly-dallied: he is relying on the military to investigate itself and he has not fired or suspended anyone. He has allowed cabinet ministers to avoid responsibility for their departments. Nelson Mandela this week announced the members of an independent commission to investigate and make recommendations about abuses in ANC camps. He has already had an internal inquiry that admitted a good deal about what happened in them. He has fallen short in not yet firing or suspending anyone, but he has opened the way for an investigation that should lead to action against the culprits. He has accepted collective responsibility for what happened, rather than relying on the defence of ignorance."

NEW NATION

De Klerk 'Always in the Know' About 'Wrong-Doings'—Johannesburg *NEW NATION* in English for 27 November-3 December in its page 18 editorial remarks: "What is emerging is a picture of a government that is corrupt at the core and one which has dealt with political opponents in the most violent ways possible. This government must be pursued relentlessly until the last of the criminals in its ranks are dealt with accordingly." "Now that the crimes of apartheid are prized open and evidence of wrong-doing is overwhelming—De Klerk pleads ignorance and sheds a crocodile tear for what has happened. Yet if one recalls the great energy, even desperation, with which he pushed through the presidents council the Further Indemnity Bill—it is obvious that he was always in the know about what was happening."

* Somchem's Rocket Launcher, Test Described

93AF0161A Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English
16 Oct 92 p 11

[Article by Anita Allen]

[Text] Some people in this country celebrated the start of Space Week with a big roar on Monday and in the process South Africans were given their first glimpse of the capabilities of the local space industry.

In 52 seconds of controlled combustion, Somchem, the systems house that manufactures launch rockets, successfully managed to burn up 10 tons of fuel at temperatures reaching 3,000 deg. C to release a thrust of approximately 500 km, capable of boosting a load of 500 kg on its way to orbit the Earth.

The launch system is made up of three solid-fuel rocket motors, linked to a computer which will jettison each motor as it burns out.

Monday's test involved a rocket motor which holds 10 tons of solid-fuel in a state-of-the-art composite material tube about 5 m long by 1.5 m in diameter.

Rocketeers said the propellant's ingredients—an oxidiser, metal fuel and a polymer—were well-known, but the secret lay in the mixing and formulation. They said the fuel's texture and colour was not unlike dough, which could be manipulated to give the required burning properties.

Instead of launching into space, the rocket motor is tested anchored horizontally on the test bench, its exhaust pointing towards a high mound of rocks about 150 m away designed to deflect exhaust gases skywards.

On firing, the solid fuel is ignited down its core, and then burns outwards, until there is none left in the tube. The burn starts comparatively slowly and then escalates in seconds to a 30 m-long yellow-white flame, which is accompanied by a sonic roar.

The resulting white exhaust gases hit the mound of rocks and mushroom into the air.

Rocketeers are quite adamant that this is a controlled burning, and say that at no time is there any danger to the surrounding environment.

The test pad itself is a concrete slab within an area of about 2 ha [hectare] which has been cleared of vegetation, revealing white sand and rocks.

Two environmentalists, Dr. Allan Heydorn, a specialist consultant for the S.A. Nature Foundation and representative of the World Wildlife Fund, and Dr. Charles Boucher, of the University of Stellenbosch department of botany, both said that monitoring carried out after previous tests had not revealed any adverse effects on flora and fauna in the area.

The test site is located within a 500 ha valley in the mountains behind Pringle Bay in the Cape, known as Klein Hangklip Mountain.

It is currently the subject of a Supreme Court action brought by the Rooi Els Local Council against the Overberg Regional Council and Somchem.

Residents are concerned that the testing activities could possibly lead to contamination of the water catchment area of the Buffles River Dam and cause environmental damage.

Heydorn, who did the initial impact study when Somchem acquired the site for test purposes, said that where man's activities were concerned there was always an impact on the environment.

The Somchem project did have an environmental impact, but this was restricted to the 2 ha of land around the test pad which had to be sacrificed, as well as a few square metres of land around the control-centre building.

He pointed out that the area had not been a pristine environment, in that the previous owner had grown proteas, which did not occur naturally in the area. Today, this land was slowly being rehabilitated to indigenous flora.

The fact that the area was not open to the public was also a plus, in Heydorn's view. Boucher agreed, and pointed out that tagging of plants and subsequent monitoring, as well as water analysis, had established that the tests were not adversely affecting the environment.

* AEC: Technology Adapted for Industry

93AF0161B Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English
26 Oct 92 p 25

[First paragraph is THE STAR introduction]

[Text] The new S.A. [South Africa] has presented lots of fresh challenges for the Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC], among them the need to become more business oriented.

S.A.'s Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) is rapidly shaking off its once sinister image and is today a business-oriented body whose function is to produce quality industrial solutions and adapt technology, products and services to create cost-effective packages for industry.

"Essentially the idea is to use our available technology, whether nuclear or non-nuclear; adapt and apply it in everyday industrial environments, often in a seemingly mundane situation," says Roland von Gogh, AEC manager corporate marketing.

In keeping with this overall philosophy, two business-oriented groups have been created within the AEC, made up in turn of several business units.

The terminology is no accident—the corporation began to apply commercial business principles to its operations three years ago and although there is no hint of privatisation at this stage, the emphasis is on applying strictly commercial principles to assess the performance of the various business units.

He says the Corporate Business Development programme is where the marketing and development of embryonic business units takes place.

This programme comprises six business units currently. They are:

- Turbo Systems Technology.
- Specialised Plating Technology.
- Biogam—a facility that supplies irradiated foodstuffs on a large scale.
- Membrasep—suppliers of membrane technology in gas and liquid separation.
- Lumitec, whose core product is low-intensity, extremely long-life lighting requiring no electrical supply.
- Nuclear Fuels Programme, involved in the conversion of "yellow cake" (uranium/diuranate) to what is known as uranium hexafluoride. This is the feedstock for the renowned and, until recently, highly secret S.A. uranium enrichment process.

The enriched uranium is processed further into pastilles of uranium dioxide, which are contained within fuel pins, in turn fabricated into fuel assemblies at Pelindaba for use in nuclear power stations.

The biggest client for the assemblies at present is Koeberg Power Station. Various products related to the nuclear fuel cycle are currently being exported.

The Nuclear Fuels Programme has a nuclear waste-disposal capability developed on the basis of extensive research and well in advance of actual waste generation.

It is said to be among the best, if not the best, in the world and is attracting international attention.

Von Gogh says the AEC is exceptionally environmentally aware and has developed outstanding technology for dealing with nuclear waste and environmental control problems in general.

A second grouping of business units, known as Peltek, incorporates the more mature business units—those that have proved themselves commercially and to which units from the Corporate Business Development Programme are "promoted" once they have achieved similar status.

This group has seven business units including HTP (High Technology Products) which was originally an offshoot of AEC activities, sold to the IDC [Industrial Development Corporation] and other shareholders four years ago for strategic reasons, it was decided to reincorporate it into AEC within the Peltek group with HTP managing director Dr. Karel Voigt as executive general manager.

The basic business units of the Peltek group now comprise:

- Isotope Production Centre—medical and industrial isotope applications.
- Fluorochemical production—products such as hydrogen fluoride, sodium, silica fluoride and numerous other bulk fluorides.
- Flosep, which produces dust-separation equipment.
- Noise Analysis, which provides systems to monitor machinery for preventative maintenance purposes.
- Nuclear Techniques Industrial Services—instrumentation development and services for process control measurement for a host of industries.
- Earth and Environmental Technology, which has its base in geology, geohydrology, meteorology and geophysics.
- Aerosol and Air Quality, which supplies technology related to aerosol physics to sectors such as the chemical and petro-chemical industries and pollution-control equipment.

Backing up the AEC's commercial enterprises is the Corporate Marketing Department, whose brief is to steer the technology-oriented groups into "real world" demand markets and basically to find ways of taking abstract technologies and applying them in down-to-earth ways.

The main market sectors targeted by AEC Marketing are mining and metallurgy, chemical and petro-chemical, environmental, medical and pharmaceutical, engineering and fabrication, agriculture and aero-space.

Should the two business programmes of the AEC have products for these or any other markets it is Corporate Marketing's responsibility to plan and co-ordinate their promotion.

Von Gogh says: "The basic premise is to address market needs rather than push technology for its own sake."

For further information, please telephone Roland Von Gogh at (012) 316- 3270.

Angola

Government, UNITA Delegations Meet in Namibe

Meeting Begins

MB2611203792 Luanda Radio Nacional Network
in Portuguese 1900 GMT 26 Nov 92

[Report from Namibe by correspondent Pedro Manuel]

[Text] The government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] are still meeting in the city of Namibe [words indistinct] in order to overcome the Angolan crisis. The meeting began at about 1630 [1530 GMT] today with a six-point agenda. Deputy Interior Minister Nando commented:

[Nando] Three of the points are from the [words indistinct] and the other three are from UNITA. The first three points include the validity of the accords, the conditions under which UNITA will send its deputies to the National Assembly, the participation in government, and the activities of the Joint Political and Military Commission [CCPM]. (UNITA) has added the UN mandate and the release of prisoners.

[Manuel] There are six points under discussion—namely, the cease-fire, the end to all movements and acts of war, and the discussion on the release of UNITA officials in custody in Luanda. Those were the points raised by UNITA which has also requested that the remains of Jeremias Chitunda and Salupeto Pena should be returned.

Deputy Minister Nando discusses the reason why the meeting is being held in Namibe:

[Nando] It is probably because of the desert. A desert has the advantage of not hiding anything. Likewise, we wish that this will be an open, frank, and clear cut meeting. We hope that the results of this meeting will be [words indistinct].

[Manuel] The meeting has not yet ended. There has been a brief intermission. Everybody is hopeful, and the two sides believe that problems can only be solved through dialogue. CCPM spokesman Dr. Antonio Monteiro is also hopeful.

[Monteiro] It is expected that government and UNITA will overcome the impasse and build the bridges for effective negotiations, and thus resume peace [words indistinct].

[Manuel] The Russian and U.S. observers within the CCPM are also attending the meeting. Margaret Anstee said that the UN Angola Verification Mission is providing security. The meeting began late because the UNITA delegation arrived late.

Jorge Valentim said that the UNITA delegation is guided by the spirit of Bicesse, and that peace is on its agenda:

[Valentim] We have come with a very open spirit. We have not come here as proponents of war, but to find ways of consolidating the mechanisms of peace. We have not come here as proponents of the division of the country, but to restore the patriotic sentiment of national unity. We have come here guided by the spirit of the Bicesse Accords, and we also hope that the government will make concessions as we are ready to make them.

[Reporter] Do you bring any concrete proposals?

[Valentim] Absolutely. The fundamental points of the agenda are peace, freedom, and democracy. We are a party for democracy. We hope to overcome the precautions that we have had to take. We think that as a result of these talks with the government we will find peace for Angola.

[Manuel] It is not known when the meeting will end. The residents of Namibe have already returned to their homes in view of the curfew in force from 2300 to 0500. Only Angolan and foreign journalists are present at the People's Assembly hall to gather information.

UNITA Representative on Progress

LD2711045492 Lisbon RDP Antena 1 Radio Network
in Portuguese 2300 GMT 26 Nov 92

[Excerpts] In the southern Angolan town of Namibe, the former Mocamedes, the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] are discussing how to find their way back to peace. [passage omitted]

One of the members of the UNITA delegation is Jorge Valentim, head of its media department, who told us a short while ago that there can be no democracy in Angola without UNITA:

[Begin Valentim recording, over poor telephone connection] As the party with the second largest share of the vote and the opposition's main force, we can assure domestic and international public opinion that there cannot be a liberal democracy, an open democracy, without UNITA. So we want to participate in the country's reconstruction, discussing and proposing solutions to the country's most pressing problems. We are ready to participate in all the national organs of sovereignty and also in the state bodies at the local level. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] We have Dr. Jorge Valentim of UNITA again on the line from Namibe. Good evening Dr. Valentim.

[Valentim] Good evening.

[Correspondent] Can we already speak of an Angola at peace? Are UNITA and the Luanda government smoking the peace pipe?

[Valentim] Absolutely. We have had one of the best meetings ever for peace in Angola. We have discussed the need to implement the peace accords in a comprehensive manner so

as to achieve peace and understanding in Angola. We have broached the problem of the cease-fire and the responsibilities falling to the two sides. We considered the fact that there should be a body to help the implementation of a cease-fire, the demilitarization process, the cantonment of troops, and the setting up of an independent police force unconnected with any political party. We have also considered the question of mediation, and the role of the United Nations has emerged strengthened from this conference...

[Correspondent, interrupting] Dr. Valentim...

[Valentim, interrupting] (?This has been) a more open conference, which has surprised not just us Angolans but the international observers themselves.

[Correspondent] Has a meeting been scheduled between Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi?

[Valentim] After we have finished discussing all the items on our agenda, which also includes, among other points, the possible release of our UNITA colleagues and leadership in Luanda. We shall be continuing our meeting next week, at which time a possible and desirable meeting between the president, Eng. Eduardo dos Santos, and the UNITA president, Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, may be considered.

[Correspondent] Will UNITA be taking up its parliamentary seats?

[Valentim] Also on the agenda is the question of UNITA's participation in parliament and in a government of national unity and reconciliation. UNITA's participation will be a reality provided the atmosphere we have enjoyed here today will endure so that the members of parliament may carry out their duties within the parameters of a truly democratic society, as in a liberal democracy, where members of parliament enjoy parliamentary immunity to monitor and supervise the government's work.

In principle, we have no objection to participating in parliament, in which we are the country's second largest elected party, or in government. The problem has only been what kind of political context would enable us to participate in Angola's democratic society, and what kind of political and physical security could be accorded us in Luanda.

Joint Communiqué

*MB2711084992 Luanda Radio Nacional Network
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 27 Nov 92*

[Joint Government-National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, communiqué issued in Namibe on 26 November, read by Dr. Jaka Jamba, member of UNITA delegation to the talks]

[Text] The first step for the resumption of dialogue between the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] was taken in Namibe yesterday. Government and UNITA delegations met in that

city with the aim of resuming talks for the resolution of the Angolan crisis. At the end of the meeting, around 2200 hours [2100 GMT], the parties issued a joint communiqué entitled Namibe Declaration.

[Begin recording] [Jamba] Namibe Declaration: The delegations of the Government of the Republic of Angola, and of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, in the presence of the special representative of the UN secretary general, Her Excellency Margaret Anstee, and distinguished observers of the Joint Political and Military Commission, meeting in Namibe city on 26 November 1992, within the framework of the continuation of the negotiating process leading to the full application of the Angolan peace accords, formally and solemnly declare before the Angolan people, and international community the following:

1. Full acceptance of the validity of the Angolan peace accords, as the only way for the solution of the Angolan problem.
2. To reinforce and apply effectively the cease-fire throughout the Angolan territory, and the immediate cessation of all offensive movement.
3. To request the extension of the UN Angola Verification Mission-2 mandate in Angola, and its major quantitative and qualitative involvement, and both sides undertake to present their specific tasks for the new mandate soon.

Namibe, 26 November 1992 [end recording]

Further on Airspace Violations by South Africa

Communiqué on Flight Into Nzeto

*MB2711135892 Luanda Radio Nacional Network
in Portuguese 1200 GMT 27 Nov 92*

[Text] A communiqué issued by the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces [FAA] says that the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] is moving its forces in Cabinda Province, using Toyota vehicles on the road between Sassa Zau and (Chicumo).

In Uige Province from 0200 [0100 GMT] on 24 November until 2200 on 25 November, Hercules C-130 aircraft flying from Zaire overflowed the city of Uige and then headed southeast.

In Zaire Province, a South African aircraft landed at Nzeto on 25 November, unloading unspecified cargo.

In Cuanza Sul Province, 300 UNITA armed elements stationed at (Cassosso) are heading to an unknown area. UNITA is stockpiling war materiel at the Belo Horizonte farm. It is reconnoitering the area leading to the (Canduta) location and is moving troops to strengthen its personnel in Capanda. Also in the same province, UNITA has established new pilot committees in various wards, while 150 armed men have taken up positions of 30 to 40 men each east of Quibala. Thirty armed men

have been deployed in the outlying areas of Conde Commune. UNITA has also deployed troops in order to destroy the bridges over the Cuanza and Cambambe Rivers and Uia River between Uacu Cungo and Quibala once its militants have been withdrawn from possible (?combat) zones.

In Moxico Province, UNITA has deployed five battalions in Camanongue, (Muchiringigi), (Luanjico), Mucai, and Salva Terra base, 65 km from Lucusse.

In Lunda Sul Province, UNITA has erected a control post on the Saurimo-Luena road, and its troops are moving troops in the outlying areas of the city of Saurimo.

In Huila Province, UNITA has deployed troops equipped with heavy weapons, including B-10 guns on the Cachicala mountain north of Caluquembe.

Officials Discuss Violations

*MB2511154892 Luanda Radio Nacional Network
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 25 Nov 92*

[Report on statements by Angolan representative to South Africa Manuel Augusto, and report on interview with Angolan Armed Forces General Higino Carneiro by unidentified Angola People's Television reporter on 24 November; place not given—recorded]

[Text] South Africa's support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] was the theme of a meeting held in Johannesburg yesterday between the Angolan representative in that country and the director of the South African Foreign Ministry's Africa Department. (Marais Conrad) protested against recent statements by Angolan officials denouncing the violations of Angola's airspace by military aircraft from South Africa. The South African diplomat said that the Angolan Government has been waging a propaganda campaign against the government of his country following the resumption of clashes with UNITA.

Angolan representative in South Africa Manuel Augusto strongly denied the claims. He reiterated the Angolan Government's accusations. He told reporters that the South African foreign minister had asked for evidence of these violations by aircraft from his country. Augusto said: I asked him if he expected us to shoot down a South African aircraft over Angolan territory in order to prove our claim. He added that it was the South African Government itself that produced the evidence, by carrying out more than five flights daily to the (Mucusso) base on the grounds that there were 10 South African medical doctors at a local hospital.

The Namibian Government has also protested against the violation of its airspace by South African aircraft. The Namibian Foreign Ministry has informed the Angolan Embassy in Namibia that unauthorized flights have been detected over Namibian territory en route

from Botswana to southern Angola. The Namibian Government said it will not assume the responsibility for the consequences of any action designed to protect its airspace. It urged the neighboring countries and other nations involved in the Angolan situation to adhere to international law and civil aviation regulations.

The Angolan Government's disclosures about the violation of its airspace were reiterated yesterday by Angolan Armed Forces General [FAA] Higino Carneiro. He said that some of the aircraft flying from South Africa use the UN insignia:

[Carneiro] Those flights continue. The aircraft for the most part use an international route that passes through Angola. So, we know that there have been regular air supplies from South Africa. The aircraft use an international corridor before they reach the Jamba region. We even know that the aircraft use the UN insignia.

We have taken measures to make the United Nations react to this state of affairs. We are not happy to see these enterprises, institutions, and organizations using the UN insignia to supply UNITA. Why do they not do it openly?

[Announcer] In his interview with Angolan television, Gen. Higino Carneiro also discussed the military situation in Angola.

[Carneiro] We could describe the military situation in the country as worrisome. Despite efforts by the government to bring the situation back to what prevailed on 29 and 30 September, we still have the same scenario. Caxito and Ndalatando are still under occupation. Military forces are present in Capanda and in the Cafunfo region. As you know, UNITA troops, obviously complying with instructions from their leaders, have destroyed all the infrastructures used in diamond mining.

Roads linking the Cambambe region to Ndalatando, Malange, and eastern and northern Angola have been blocked. The same scenario prevails in eastern Angola, though our worries there are not the same.

[Announcer] The FAA general said UNITA has not changed its position, and this could force the government to resort to force.

[Carneiro] The government has already stated that we will continue to uphold the Angolan peace accord. We will only resort to force if we are left with no other alternative. We want to talk. Actually, we are in touch with the UNITA leadership. Although General Ndalu is absent from the country for health reasons, there have been regular meetings with Dr. Savimbi. We have presented our proposals, and we hope that a meeting between the two delegations will be held on 26 November at the latest. So, it is not a question of Gen. Ndalu meeting Dr. Savimbi in Huambo, but we are

working to see to it that the government and UNITA delegations should meet to discuss issues relating to the peace accord.

[Reporter] You mean military and political issues?

[Carneiro] Precisely.

[Reporter] So, judging from the latest developments, peace is nearer than it was before?

[Carneiro] Well, the situation has improved in many areas. If UNITA says its troops are pressuring the leadership, then the same situation happens with the government.

'Major' UNITA Troop Movements Reported

MB2511151792 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1200 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] The political and military situation in Angola remains complex.

The occupation of the city of Ndalatando by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] has caused major problems with the supply of fuels and lubricants. A liter of gasoline now costs 2,000 kwanzas, a liter of diesel 600 kwanzas, and a liter of oil more than 5,000 kwanzas. Vehicles are standing idle, and the local radio station might have to suspend operations because fuel for the generators is running low.

In Benguela, the government and UNITA have not yet been able to restore the trust of the residents in the peace process. Outstanding issues include respect for human rights, the reinstatement of state authority, and the free movement of people and goods.

UNITA forces are carrying out military operations in the outlying areas of the city of Malange, murdering civilians and destroying their property.

In Uacu Cungu, Cuanza Sul Province, UNITA has issued weapons to its sympathizers from Luanda and Sumbe and erected a control post at Lucusso.

There are reports of major movements by UNITA troops in various parts of the country. In Moxico Province, UNITA is moving troops from (?Cavimbe) to Chicala. In Huila Province, UNITA troops are being moved from Cutonda to Jamba Mineira and are planning to raid Kihita commune and destroy a bridge in the area.

Meanwhile, reports from Matala say that some 200 elements of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [FALA] have deserted from the Angolan Armed Forces [FAA].

In Cuando Cubango Province, UNITA is transporting (?troops) from Huambo.

In Ndalatando, UNITA is moving some 200 heavily armed men to launch a counterattack on the city of Dondo.

UNITA troop movements have also been reported from (Quipedro) to Caxito with a view to raiding the Luanda refinery. UNITA is assembling large-caliber artillery pieces at the Dande Outerbank. A government military source has also reported the movement of fishing vessels with FALA personnel on board, though the personnel were wearing civilians clothes. The vessels sail from Ambriz to Santiago and (Carico) beaches.

The Angolan Government, however, says it will continue to uphold the peace accord. FAA General Higinio Carneiro said that the government will use force if there is no other alternative left. Interviewed by Angola People's Television, Gen. Carneiro said that two government and UNITA delegations will probably meet tomorrow to discuss issues relating to the peace accord.

Gen. Carneiro described the current political and military situation as worrisome. He again mentioned the violation of the Angolan airspace, adding that some of the aircraft flying from South Africa carry the UN insignia. He said that the Angola Government expects the United Nations to comment on the situation.

Mozambique

Army General Staff Confirms Lugela 'Retaken'

MB2511151292 Maputo Radio Maputo in English 1100 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Excerpt] The General Staff of the Mozambique Armed Forces has confirmed that Mozambican troops have retaken the town of Lugela, in the central province of Zambezia. This was the last of the four towns seized by Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] in mid-October that was still in rebel hands. Lugela was occupied by Renamo on 20 October and, in a communique issued last night, the General Staff says that measures were not taken immediately to expel Renamo because of a request from the United Nations.

The UN special representative to Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, asked the government to refrain from military actions from [words indistinct] by the UN [words indistinct] allow Renamo to make a peaceful withdrawal. The General Staff said Mr. Ajello promised the government that Renamo would (?leave the town) very soon and indeed at one point the head of the Renamo Organization Department, Raul Domingos, even announced a withdrawal from Lugela only to contradict himself the following day. [passage omitted]

CSC Discusses Cease-Fire Implementation

MB2511184692 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1730 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] The Supervision and Control Commission [CSC], which was created within the framework of the General Peace Accord signed in Rome, met in Maputo today to discuss and approve the rules that its investigation teams must follow should cease-fire violations occur.

Speaking to the media shortly after the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Sinha, commander of the UN forces in Mozambique, said those rules have come into force on an interim basis. The definitive rules must still be approved by the United Nations. The meeting also looked into Mozambique Government and Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] reports of violations to the Rome Peace Accords. It also drew up a plan for trips to areas where such violations are said to have occurred, so they can be investigated.

Lt. Col. Sinha said the meeting also (?indicated) troop confinement points for both sides and discussed related technical issues.

Lt. Col. Sinha noted that he had found the meeting generally satisfactory, and that everything discussed there will be submitted to the CSC for approval. Sinha said the CSC recognized that both sides have violated the peace accords, and he added the issue of troop confinement points has not been fully discussed because, he said, the participants at the meeting were tired and there had not been enough time.

Meanwhile, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Portugal—the five observer countries in the CSC—issued a statement this evening saying they fully trust UN competence and impartiality in the discharge of the duties conferred upon it by the Rome Accords. Those five countries also note both sides are expected to respect the cease-fire agreement fully in terms of the accord. They also expressed regret about the fact that both the government and Renamo have acted on the basis of mutual accusations, when in fact the accord provides for legal mechanisms to resolve this sort of dispute, and they add those mechanisms should have been used. That statement also urges both sides to adhere scrupulously to the Rome accords, to cooperate with the United Nations and its Security Council, and to act in conformity with the text of and procedures defined by the Rome Accords.

In their statement, those countries expressed satisfaction that cease-fire violations have been few and far between, that the country is generally experiencing peace, and that the Mozambican people are determined to turn the promises of the Rome Accords into reality.

Madagascar

First Round of Presidential Elections Begins

AB2511175892 Paris AFP in English 0813 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] Antananarivo, Nov 25 (AFP)—Some 5.5 million voters on the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar were called to the polls Wednesday [25 November] in the first round of presidential elections that could end the 17-year old autocratic rule of Admiral Didier Ratsiraka.

Ratsiraka, 56, a former Marxist and now a moderate, faces a divided opposition that has put forward seven candidates. But two of them, Albert Zafy, a 65-year-old surgeon, and former Maoist Manadafy Rakotonirina, 54, are seen as having a chance of unseating Ratsiraka.

Polling stations were to close at 5.00 p.m. (1400 GMT). Here in the capital long lines of voters had already formed ahead of the 7.00 a.m. (0400 GMT) opening.

The ballot follows the overwhelming approval in an referendum last August of a new constitution providing for strong central government, instead of the federal system Ratsiraka supporters wanted. The president has campaigned flanked by his heavily-armed praetorian guard, or Presidential Security Regiment, the same unit that on August 10, 1991 opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by some 500,000 anti-Ratsiraka supporters, killing 200 of them.

Zafy, who since October 1991 has headed an interim executive body that was imposed on Ratsiraka by popular pressure, has his power base in the capital Antananarivo, where 1.2 million of the island's 12 million population live.

Manadafy, an economist and sociologist, has the backing of the Movement for the Development of Madagascar, which enjoys broad support across the island.

Observers say Wednesday's first-round ballot is likely to be a close race between Ratsiraka, Manadafy and Zafy, with any of the three a possible winner.

Because of the remoteness of some polling stations, final official results for the first round are not expected until three weeks after the vote ends, which would mean a date for the second round, if necessary, being set for January next year.

Zafy Said Leading

EA2611063092 Antananarivo Radio Madagascar
Network in Malagasy 1822 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Report from an unidentified correspondent at the Interior Ministry building in Antananarivo—live]

[Text] Regarding election results so far, it is worth giving some news to listeners who, I suppose, are most eager to hear about results: In Antananarivo in general, results from about 80 polling stations show that about 65 percent of voters have voted for candidate Albert Zafy [leader of Rasalama Active Forces, a coalition of anti-Ratsiraka political parties and associations] so far, with the seven other candidates following behind. These are only partial results. The final results will probably reach the dome at the Interior Ministry headquarters from where I am reporting shortly after 2200.

Liberia

NPFL Shells Monrovia 26 Nov, One Killed

AB2711141092 Paris AFP in French 1254 GMT 27 Nov 92

[Text] Monrovia, 27 Nov (AFP)—A Monrovia resident was killed in a rocket attack yesterday by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) while artillery shots continued today around the besieged capital. The victim, Joe Gbandi, was killed on Bushrod Island, the industrial and working class district northeast of the capital, according to eye-witnesses. Bushrod Island is where the harbor and the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group [ECOMOG] are located. The NPFL recently appealed to the inhabitants to evacuate that sector.

ECOMOG artillery shots against the outlying areas east and northeast of the capital which are under NPFL control were heard throughout the night. ECOMOG has asserted that NPFL has continued to attack and bomb its positions in spite of the adoption a week ago of a UN resolution calling for a cease-fire. Charles Taylor had said he would respect that resolution, which also imposed an embargo on the supply of arms.

Sierra Leone

Strasser Accepts Finance Minister's Resignation

AB2611130092 Freetown SLBS Radio in English 2000 GMT 25 Nov 92

[Text] A press release from the secretariat of the NPRC [National Provisional Ruling Council] states that the chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council and head of state of the Republic of Sierra Leone, has accepted the letter of resignation of Dr. James S.A. Funna, former secretary of state, Department of Finance, Development, and Economic Planning. Dr. Funna, in his letter of resignation, thanked the chairman for giving him the opportunity to serve in his government and outlined improvements achieved in the state of affairs of the national economy since the 29th of April but stated that for personal reasons, he had to turn in his resignation with immediate effect.

In accepting his letter, the chairman thanked Dr. Funna for the services he had rendered to the Government and people of Sierra Leone and stated that it was unfortunate that Dr. Funna could not cope with pressures of work, but hoped that he would now find the time to look after his health and opportunity of having a well deserved rest.

[Paris AFP in English in a Freetown datelined item at 1106 GMT on 25 November adds: "Sierra Leone's

Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning Jim Funna has resigned for personal reasons, national radio announced here Thursday. Funna was the only remaining member of the government to have kept his post after a military coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser in April ousted President Joseph Momoh, who has fled to Guinea.

["Informed sources said Funna, currently in Washington, announced his decision in writing on Tuesday (24 November) and the junta accepted it after an emergency meeting the following day. On Monday (23 November), Funna reached agreement with the Paris Club of creditor nations and institutions on the rescheduling of Sierra Leone's 1.11 billion dollar public debt. He last year negotiated an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. His resignation comes three weeks after Foreign Minister Ramadan Dumbuya was sacked by the junta. No replacement for either man has been named. The government now includes 10 soldiers and five civilians."]

Togo

Police, Youth Clash in Lome, Three Reported Dead

AB2711140192 Paris AFP in French 1152 GMT 27 Nov 92

[Text] Lome, 27 Nov (AFP)—Three persons were killed and three others wounded in Lome yesterday during a shootout between policemen and some young people in the first acts of violence recorded since the general strike was launched 12 days ago, the Gendarmerie disclosed today. According to the Gendarmerie, some youth intercepted and burned down a taxi on which several passengers including "a plainclothes security officer" were riding in Adakpame district of Lome, near the airport. They molested the passengers, seized the security officer's weapon, and opened fire when police reinforcements arrived. According to the Gendarmerie, the policemen fired back leaving three dead and three wounded among the youth.

Lome has been paralyzed for about 12 days now by the general strike called by trade unions and opposition parties urging a proclamation of the Army's neutrality, the prosecution of those soldiers who took some 40 parliamentarians hostage about a month ago, and the formation of a new government.

The opposition has called on its supporters to observe nonviolence.

Young activists assert that plain clothed policemen, gendarmes or soldiers are serving as private bodyguards of sympathizers of President Gnassingbe Eyadema who is opposed to the strike.

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